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vThe Emissions Gap Report 2012 – Glossary
Annex I Countries – the industrialised countries (and 
those in transition to a market economy) which took on 
obligations to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions 
under the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change.
Aerosols – are collections of airborne solid or liquid 
particles, with a typical size between 0.01 and 10 
micrometer (a millionth of a meter) that reside in the 
atmosphere for at least several hours. They may influence 
the climate directly by scattering and absorbing radiation, 
and indirectly by acting as cloud condensation nuclei or 
modifying the optical properties and lifetime of clouds.
BioCCS (Bioenergy and Carbon Capture and Storage) 
– is the use of energy produced from biomass where 
the combustion gases are then captured and stored 
underground or elsewhere.
Black Carbon – a form of air pollution consisting of carbon 
particles produced by incomplete combustion of fuels. It 
is produced especially by diesel-powered vehicles, open 
biomass burning, cooking stoves and other sources.
‘Bottom up’ Model – a model which represents reality 
by aggregating characteristics of specific activities and 
processes, considering technological, engineering and cost 
information.
Business-as-Usual – a scenario used for projections of 
future emissions assuming no action, or no new action, is 
taken to mitigate emissions.
Carbon Credits – tradeable permits which aim to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions by giving them a monetary 
value.
Carbon Dioxide Equivalent (CO2e) – a simple way to 
place emissions of various climate change agents on a 
common footing to account for their effect on climate. It 
describes, for a given mixture and amount of greenhouse 
gas, the equivalent weight of carbon dioxide that would 
have the same global warming ability, when measured 
over a specified timescale. For the purpose of this report, 
greenhouse gas emissions (unless otherwise specified) are 
the sum of the basket of greenhouse gases listed in this 
glossary under the entry: “Greenhouse Gases covered by 
the Kyoto Protocol”.
Carbon Leakage – according to the IPCC, carbon leakage 
occurs when there is an increase in carbon dioxide 
emissions in one country as a result of an emissions 
reduction by a second country. For example, an increase 
in local fossil fuel prices resulting from mitigation policies 
may lead to the re-allocation of production to regions with 
less stringent mitigation rules (or with no rules at all), thus 
causing higher emissions in those regions.
Conditional Pledges – pledges made by some countries that 
may be contingent on the ability of national legislatures to 
enact the necessary laws, or ambitious action from other 
countries, or realisation of finance and technical support, 
or other factors.
Double Counting – in the context of this report, “double 
counting” refers to a situation in which the same emission 
reductions are counted towards meeting two countries’ 
pledges.
Emissions Pathway – the trajectory of annual global 
greenhouse gas emissions over time.
EU27 – The 27 Member States of the European Union.
Global Warming Potential (GWP) – A relative index that 
enables comparison of the climate effect of the emissions 
of various greenhouse gases (and other climate changing 
agents). Carbon dioxide, the greenhouse gas that causes 
the greatest radiative forcing because of its overwhelming 
abundance, is chosen as the reference gas.  
Greenhouse Gases covered by the Kyoto Protocol – 
include the six main greenhouse gases, as listed in Annex 
A of the Kyoto Protocol: Carbon dioxide (CO2); Methane 
(CH4); Nitrous oxide (N2O); Hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs); 
Perfluorocarbons (PFCs); and Sulphur hexafluoride (SF6).
Glossary
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Integrated Assessment Models – are models of climate 
change that seek to combine knowledge from multiple 
disciplines in the form of equations and/or algorithms. 
As such, they describe the full chain of climate change, 
including relevant linkages and feedbacks between socio-
economic and biophysical processes.
Kyoto Protocol – the international environmental treaty 
intended to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. It adds 
additional provisions to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change.
Lenient Rules – pledge cases with maximum Annex I 
“lenient LULUCF credits” and surplus emissions units.
Likely Chance – a greater than 66% likelihood. Used in this 
report to convey the probability of meeting temperature 
limits.
Medium Chance – a 50 to 66% likelihood. Used in this 
report to convey the probability of meeting temperature 
limits.
Montreal Protocol – the multilateral environmental 
agreement dealing with the depletion of the earth’s ozone 
layer.  
Non-Annex I Countries – a group of developing countries 
that have signed and ratified the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change. They do not have binding 
emission reduction targets.
Pledge – for the purpose of this report, pledges include 
Annex I targets and non-Annex I actions as included in 
Appendix I and Appendix II of the Copenhagen Accord.
Radiative Forcing (RF) – is the global mean radiation 
imbalance over the radiation ‘budget’ of the earth’s 
atmosphere. A positive forcing warms the system, while a 
negative forcing cools it. 
Scenario – a description of how the future may unfold 
based on ‘if-then’ propositions. Climate change scenarios 
typically include an initial socio-economic situation and a 
description of the key driving forces and future changes in 
emissions, temperature, or other climate change-related 
variables.
Strict Rules – pledge cases in which the impact of “lenient 
LULUCF credits” and surplus emissions units are set to zero.
‘Top down’ Model – a model that applies macroeconomic 
theory, econometric and optimisation techniques to 
aggregate economic variables. Using historical data on 
consumption, prices, incomes, and factor costs, top-
down models assess final demand for goods and services, 
and supply from main sectors, such as the energy sector, 
transportation, agriculture and industry.
Transient Climate Response – is a measure of the strength 
and rapidity of the surface temperature response to 
greenhouse gas forcing, according to the IPCC.
20th – 80th percentile range – results that fall within the 20-
80% range of the frequency distribution of results in this 
assessment.
Unconditional Pledges – pledges made by countries 
without conditions attached to their fulfilment.
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BaU Business-as-Usual
BC Black Carbon 
BRT  Bus Rapid Transit 
BUENAS Bottom-up Energy Analysis System 
CCS Carbon Capture and Storage 
CDM Clean Development Mechanism 
CFC Chlorofluorocarbon
CO2e Carbon Dioxide Equivalent
COP Conference of the Parties to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GEA  Global Energy Assessment 
GHG Greenhouse Gas
Gt Gigatonne (1 billion tonnes)
GW Gigawatt
HFCs Hydrofluorocarbons
IAM Integrated Assessment Model
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization
IEA International Energy Agency
IMO International Maritime Organization
IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
LBNL  Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory 
LULUCF Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry 
MW  Megawatt
NAMA Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Action
OC Organic carbon 
PAMS Policy Analysis Modelling System 
PES  Payments for Ecosystem Services 
PV Photovoltaic
RE Renewable Energy 
REDD+  Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and 
Forest Degradation 
SEAD  Super-efficient Equipment and Appliance 
Deployment 
SRREN  IPCC Special Report on Renewable Energy 
Sources and Climate Change Mitigation
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change
Acronyms
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Foreword
This third Emissions Gap Report provides a sobering 
assessment of the gulf between ambition and reality in 
respect to keeping a global average temperature rise this 
century under 2 degrees Celsius.
As in previous Gap reports, designed to inform 
governments in advance of the annual Conference of the 
Parties (COP) to the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change and empower scaled-up action, the 
analysis focuses on how nations are faring towards bringing 
emissions down to around 44 gigatonnes of CO2 equivalent 
or less by year 2020.
The result of this year’s analysis shows that without action, 
emissions are likely to be at 58 gigatonnes (Gt) in eight years’ 
time, leaving a gap that is now bigger than it was in earlier 
assessments, as a result of projected economic growth in 
particular in key developing economies.
Even if the most ambitious level of pledges and 
commitments were implemented by all countries under the 
strictest set of rules, the analysis shows that there would still 
be a gap of 8 Gt of CO2 equivalent by 2020. This is 2 Gt higher 
than last year’s assessment with yet another year passing by. 
Can the gap be bridged by 2020? From a technical 
standpoint the answer remains yes with an estimated 
potential to bring down emissions by 17 Gt by the 2020 
timeline – the challenge is that current investments in 
buildings, transportation systems, factories, and other 
infrastructure are “locking in” high energy use patterns and 
associated emissions for decades, limiting future options for 
abating emissions.
The 2012 Report for the first time reviews a number 
of successful policy actions that have been effective in 
substantially reducing emissions at the national level. For 
example, appliance standards, performance standards for 
vehicles, and economic incentives to reduce deforestation 
to name but three.
Many of these are being implemented for reasons other 
than climate change and they are generating multiple 
‘Green Economy’ benefits and opportunities right across the 
sustainable development landscape. 
Replicating these successful policies and scaling them up 
would provide one way for countries to go beyond their 
current pledges and assist in closing the gap.  Under the UN 
climate convention negotiations, governments are working 
to a new international agreement by 2015 to become 
operational by 2020. The Emissions Gap Report 2012 
underlines the importance of strong global action post 2020, 
but emphasizes that unless action to close the Gap is taken 
urgently, the longer term challenge may be insurmountable 
or at best, very costly.
Achim Steiner 
UN Under-Secretary-General,  
UNEP Executive Director
1The Emissions Gap Report 2012 – Executive Summary
One of the fundamental questions in the global climate 
negotiations is: what level of “ambition”, in terms of collective 
emission reductions, is needed to protect global climate?  To 
help answer this question UNEP and the scientific community 
have published a series of reports on the “emissions gap1” 
since 2010.  Of particular interest to the ambition question is 
the gap in 2020 between emission levels consistent with the 
2oC climate target and emissions levels projected if country 
reduction pledges are fulfilled. If there is a gap, then there is 
doubt that the ambition of countries is great enough to meet 
the agreed-upon 2oC climate target
In the 2010 Emissions Gap Report, scientists indicated that 
there would likely be a substantial emissions gap in 2020, 
although estimates of this gap ranged widely, depending on 
assumptions about how country pledges would be complied 
with. In the 2011 Bridging the Emissions Gap Report, 
scientists noted that enough technical potential existed 
to close the gap in 2020, but fast action by countries was 
needed. 
UNEP has now convened a group of 55 scientists and 
experts from 43 scientific groups across 22 countries to 
produce this third emissions gap report which covers the 
following:
• An update of global greenhouse gas emission estimates, 
based on a number of different authoritative scientific 
sources; 
• An overview of national emission levels, both current 
(2010) and projected (2020) consistent with current 
pledges and other commitments;  
• An estimate of the level of global emissions consistent 
with the two degree target in 2020, 2030 and 2050;
• An update of the assessment of the emissions gap for 
2020;
• A review of selected examples of the rapid progress 
being made in different parts of the world to 
implement policies already leading to substantial 
emission reductions. These policies could contribute 
significantly to narrowing the gap if they are scaled up 
and replicated in other countries.
1 The “emissions gap” is the difference in 2020 between emission levels 
consistent with the 2°C limit and projected emission levels.
1. What are current global emissions?
Current global emissions are already considerably higher 
than the emissions level consistent with the 2oC target in 
2020 and are still growing.
Current global greenhouse gas emissions, based on 
2010 data from bottom-up emission inventory studies, are 
estimated at 50.1 GtCO2e (with a 95% uncertainty range 
of 45.6 - 54.6). This is already 14% higher than the median 
estimate (44 GtCO2e) of the emission level in 2020 with a 
likely chance of meeting the 2oC target. This is also about 
20% higher than emissions in 2000. Global emissions are 
now picking up again after their decline during the economic 
downturn between 2008 and 2009. Modeling groups use 
a median value of 49 GtCO2e for 2010, which is within 
the uncertainty range. The figure of 49 GtCO2e is used 
throughout the rest of the report unless otherwise noted.    
2. What is the latest estimate of the 
Emissions Gap in 2020?
The estimated emissions gap in 2020 for a “likely” chance 
of being on track to stay below the 2oC target is 8 to 13 
GtCO2e (depending on how emission reduction pledges 
are implemented), as compared to 6 to 11 GtCO2e in last 
years’ Bridging the Emissions Gap Report. The gap is larger 
because of higher than expected economic growth and the 
inclusion of “double counting”2 of emission offsets in the 
calculations.  
The assessment clearly shows that country pledges, if 
fully implemented, will help reduce emissions to below the 
Business-as-Usual (BaU) level in 2020, but not to a level 
consistent with the agreed upon 2oC target, and therefore 
will lead to a considerable “emissions gap”. 
As a reference point, the emissions gap in 2020 between 
BaU emissions and emissions with a “likely” chance of 
meeting the 2°C target is 14 GtCO2e.
As in previous reports, four cases are considered which 
combine assumptions about pledges (unconditional or 
2 In the context of this report, “double counting” refers to a situation in which 
the same emission reductions are counted towards meeting two countries’ 
pledges.
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Projected emissions based on 
pledges made
Global map showing the diﬀerent categories of pledges
Estimated global emissions
1990 2005 2010
Business-
as-Usual
2020
Case 1
2020
Case 2
2020
Case 3
2020
Case 4
2020
37
GtCO2e
45
GtCO2e
49
GtCO2e
58
GtCO2e
57
GtCO2e 54
GtCO2e
55
GtCO2e 52
GtCO2e  
Case 1 – Unconditional pledges, lenient rules
If countries implement their lower-ambition pledges and 
are subject to “lenient” accounting rules, then the median 
estimate of annual GHG emissions in 2020 is 57 GtCO₂e, 
within a range of 56 – 57 GtCO₂e. 
Case 2 – Unconditional pledges, strict rules 
This case occurs if countries keep to their lower-ambition 
pledges, but are subject to “strict” accounting rules. In this 
case, the median estimate of emissions in 2020 is 54 GtCO₂e, 
within a range of 54 – 55 GtCO₂e. 
Case 3 – Conditional pledges, lenient rules 
Some countries oﬀered to be more ambitious with their 
pledges, but link that to conditions. If the more ambitious 
conditional pledges are taken into account, but accounting 
rules are “lenient”, median estimates of emissions in 2020 
are 55 GtCO₂e within a range of 54 – 56 GtCO₂e. 
Case 4 – Conditional pledges, strict rules 
If countries adopt higher-ambition pledges and are also 
subject to “strict” accounting rules, the median estimate 
of emissions in 2020 is 52 GtCO₂e, within a range of 
51 – 52 GtCO₂e. 
Please note: All emission values shown in the text are rounded to the nearest gigatonne.
Pledges formulated in terms of GHG emissions Submitted actions No pledge
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conditional) and rules for complying with pledges (lenient or 
strict) (See footnote3 for an explanation). 
• Under Case 1 – “Unconditional pledges, lenient rules”, 
the gap would be about 13 GtCO2e (range: 9-16 
GtCO2e). Projected emissions are about 1 GtCO2e lower 
than the business-as-usual level. 
• Under Case 2 – “Unconditional pledges, strict rules”, the 
gap would be about 10 GtCO2e (range: 7-14 GtCO2e). 
Projected emissions are about 4 GtCO2e lower than the 
business-as-usual level. 
• Under Case 3 – “Conditional pledges, lenient rules”, the 
gap would be about 11 GtCO2e (range: 7-15 GtCO2e). 
Projected emissions are about 3 GtCO2e lower than the 
business-as-usual level. 
• Under Case 4 – “Conditional pledges, strict rules”, the 
gap would be about 8 GtCO2e (range: 4-11 GtCO2e). 
Projected emissions are about 6 GtCO2e lower than the 
business-as-usual level. 
There is increasing uncertainty that conditions currently 
attached to the high end of country pledges will be met and 
in addition there is some doubt that governments may agree 
to stringent international accounting rules for pledges. It is 
therefore more probable than not that the gap in 2020 will be 
at the high end of the 8 to 13 GtCO2e range. 
On the positive side, fully implementing the conditional 
pledges and applying strict rules brings emissions more than 
40% of the way from BaU to the 2°C target.
To stay within the 2°C limit global emissions will have to 
peak before 20204
Emission scenarios analyzed in this report and consistent 
with a “likely” chance of meeting the 2°C target have a peak 
before 20205, and have emission levels in 2020 of about 44 
GtCO2e (range: 41-47 GtCO2e). Afterwards, global emissions 
steeply decline (a median of 2.5% per year, with a range 
of 2.0 to 3.0% per year)6. Forty percent of the assessed 
scenarios with a “likely” chance to meet the 2°C target have 
net negative total greenhouse gas emissions before the 
end of the century 2100. The implications of net negative 
emissions are discussed in Point 4. 
Accepting a “medium” (50-66%) rather than “likely” 
chance of staying below the 2°C limit relaxes the constraints 
on emission levels slightly, but global emissions still peak 
before 2020.
The few studies available indicate that a 1.5°C target can 
still be met 
Emissions in 2020 are lower in scenarios meeting the 
1.5°C target compared with the 2°C level. The few scenarios 
3 In this report, an “unconditional” pledge is one made without conditions 
attached. A “conditional” pledge might depend on the ability of a national 
legislature to enact necessary laws, or may depend on action from other 
countries, the provision of finance, or technical support. “Strict” rules mean 
that allowances from LULUCF accounting and surplus emission credits will 
not be counted as part of a country meeting its emissions reduction pledges. 
Under “lenient” rules, these elements can be counted.
4 This is the case for scenarios using least cost pathways; see Chapter 3 for 
detailed explanation.
5 Global annual emissions consist of emissions of the “Kyoto basket of gases” 
coming from energy, industry and land use. 
6 Throughout this report average emission reduction rates from 2020 to 2050 
are given for carbon dioxide emissions from energy and industry and expressed 
relative to 2000 emission levels except where explicitly otherwise stated.
available for this target indicate that scenarios consistent 
with a “medium” chance of meeting the 1.5oC limit have 
average emission levels in 2020 of around 43 GtCO2e (due to 
the limited number of studies no range was calculated), and 
are followed by very rapid rates of global emission reduction, 
amounting to 3% per year (range 2.1 to 3.4%). Some studies 
also find that some overshoot of the 1.5oC limit over the 
course of the century is inevitable. 
3. What emission levels in 2030 and 2050 
are consistent with the 2o and 1.5oC 
targets?
Scenarios that meet the 2oC limit show a maximum 
emission level in 2030 of 37 GtCO2e
Given the Durban decision to complete negotiations on a 
new treaty by 2015 for the period after 2020, it has become 
increasingly important to know the global emission levels in 
2030 that are likely to comply with the climate targets. The 
emission scenarios assessed in this report and consistent 
with a “likely” chance of meeting the 2°C target have global 
emissions in 2030 of approximately 37 GtCO2e (range: 33 to 
44 GtCO2e). This is around the same level of emissions as 
in 1990. It is important to emphasize that the 2030 range 
depends on where emissions are in 2020. The higher the 
emissions in 2020, the lower they must be by 2030.
Scenarios that meet the 2oC limit have global emissions in 
2050 roughly 40% below 1990 emission levels and roughly 
60% below 2010 emission levels. 
Scenarios with a “likely” chance of complying with the 2°C 
target have global emissions in 2050 of approximately 21 
GtCO2e (range: 18 to 25 GtCO2e), if the 2020 and 2030 levels 
indicated above are met.
4. What are the implications of scenarios 
that meet the 2020 emission levels 
consistent with 1.5oC and 2oC?
As noted above, 40% of the assessed scenarios with a 
“likely” chance to meet the 2°C target have net negative 
total greenhouse gas emissions before the end of the 
century. The majority of scenarios have net negative CO2 
emissions at some point in the second half of this century 
in the global energy and industry sectors. 
“Net negative emissions” means that on a global basis 
more greenhouse gases are taken up from the atmosphere 
by deliberate actions (e.g. by planting forests or through 
carbon capture and storage) than what is emitted by 
anthropogenic sources. Individual technologies or sectors 
may also generate a “net negative emission” specifically 
related to their actions.  
To achieve such negative emissions is simple in analytical 
models but in real life implies a need to apply new and 
often unproven technologies or technology combinations 
at significant scale. 
As an example, many studies that meet the 2°C target 
assume a significant deployment of bioenergy combined 
with carbon capture and storage (BioCCS), to achieve net 
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negative CO2 emissions in the industry and energy sectors 
or even net negative total global emissions. The feasibility 
and consequences of such large-scale bioenergy systems 
will need to be closely examined because of their possible 
impact on food production and biodiversity, the possible lack 
of sufficient land and water, and questions about the long-
term productivity of biomass feedstocks. The application 
of carbon capture and storage (CCS) is still fraught with 
controversy and large scale application and safe CO2 disposal 
has not yet been fully verified. If net negative CO2 emissions 
at a significant scale are proven later to be infeasible, a 
radical shift to other mitigation options may come too late to 
stay within the 2°C target.
Policies that greatly accelerate energy efficiency improve-
ments on both the demand- and supply-side can, if widely 
applied, reduce the need for net negative emissions and al-
low more time for a transition to a global economy with 
radically lower greenhouse gas emissions. 
Some assessments, notably the IPCC Special Report on 
Renewable Energy Sources and Climate Change Mitigation 
and the Global Energy Assessment (GEA) emphasize the 
great importance of accelerating demand-side efficiency and 
conservation measures for future reductions of greenhouse 
gas emissions. A headline conclusion of the GEA scenario 
assessment is that a significantly lower level of global energy 
demand would make it possible to reach the 2°C and other 
sustainability targets without relying on a combination of 
nuclear energy and carbon capture and storage. But it must be 
emphasized that it would be necessary to greatly accelerate 
the current rate of energy efficiency improvements, and the 
feasibilty of doing so has been fully investigated. 
5. What are the implications of scenarios 
that meet the 2°C target, but have higher 
global emissions in 2020?
Based on a very limited number of studies, it is expected 
that scenarios with higher global emissions in 2020 are 
likely to have higher medium- and long-term costs, and – 
more importantly – pose serious risks of not being feasible 
in practice. 
The estimates of the emissions gap in this and previous 
reports are based on least cost scenarios which depict the 
trend in global emissions up to 2100 under the assumption 
that climate targets are met by the cheapest combination 
of policies, measures and technologies considered in a 
particular model.7 There are now a few published studies on 
later action scenarios that have taken a different approach. 
These scenarios also seek to limit greenhouse gas emissions 
to levels consistent with 2°C, but assume less short-term 
mitigation and thus higher emissions in the near term. 
Because of the small number of studies along these lines, 
the question about the costs and risks of these later action 
scenarios cannot be conclusively quantified right now. 
That being said, it is clear that later action will imply 
lower near-term mitigation costs.  But the increased lock-
in of carbon-intensive technologies will lead to significantly 
7 Some models impose further restrictions on the technologies they take into 
account. 
higher mitigation costs over the medium- and long-term. In 
addition, later action will lead to more climate change with 
greater and more costly impacts, and higher emission levels 
will eventually have to be brought down by society at a price 
likely to be higher than current mitigation costs per tonne of 
greenhouse gas. 
Moreover, later action will have a higher risk of failure. 
For example, later action scenarios are likely to require even 
higher levels of “net negative emissions” to stay within the 
2°C target, and less flexibility for policy makers in choosing 
technological options. Later action could also require much 
higher rates of energy efficiency improvement after 2020 
than have ever been realised so far, not only in industrialized 
countries but also in developing countries.
6. Can the gap be bridged by 2020 – and 
how?  
From a technical standpoint, the answer to this question is, 
yes. The technical potential for reducing emissions by 2020 
is estimated to be about 17 ± 3 GtCO2e, at marginal costs8 
below US$ 50-100/ t CO2e reduced. This is enough to close 
the gap between BaU emissions and emissions that meet 
the 2°C or 1.5°C target.   
Since the 2011 Bridging the Emissions Gap presented 
these numbers, there have been several new studies of the 
potential to reduce emissions, confirming that the estimate 
of the mitigation potential for 2020 of 17 ± 3 GtCO2e is still 
valid. 
The challenge is the current pace of action. Even if the 
potential remains the same there is basically one year less 
to achieve this reduction, implying steeper and more costly 
actions will be required to potentially bridge the emissions 
gap by 2020.
At the same time current investments in buildings, 
transportation systems, factories, and other infrastructure 
are “locking in” high energy use patterns and associated 
emissions for decades, limiting future options for abating 
emissions.
The gap can be narrowed by resolving some immediate 
climate negotiation issues 
Possible actions to narrow the gap include:
• Implementing the more ambitious “conditional” 
pledges. This would reduce the gap by 2 GtCO2e. 
• Minimizing the use of lenient Land Use, Land Use 
Change and Forestry (LULUCF) credits and surplus 
emission credits. This would reduce the gap by around 
3 GtCO2e.
• Minimizing the use of the surplus Assigned Amounts 
from the 2008-2012 Kyoto period. This would reduce 
the gap by 1.8 GtCO2e.
• Avoiding the double-counting of offsets and improving 
the additionality of CDM projects. This would reduce 
the gap by up to 1.5 GtCO2e.
Note that these numbers are not directly additive.
8 Marginal costs are the costs of the last tonne of equivalent CO2 removed. The 
average costs of all the reductions together are much lower.
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Policy actions at the national and local level are being 
implemented in a growing number of countries and have 
shown to be effective in substantially reducing emissions. 
Replicating these successful policies and scaling them 
up would provide a way for countries to go beyond their 
current pledges and help to close the gap. 
Most of these policies are now being carried out primarily 
for reasons other than climate change mitigation. It is clear, 
therefore, that countries can contribute to narrowing the 
emissions gap by enhanced action in line with their own 
national development priorities.
The following selected policies were reviewed in this 
report because they have been successful in reducing 
emissions and show promise in being scaled up nationally 
and internationally. However, they only represent a few of 
the many promising policies meriting further consideration: 
• In the building sector promising policies include: 
(i) building codes and 
(ii) appliance standards. 
The motivation for these policies has been mostly to 
reduce residential and private sector energy use and 
costs and to increase safety.  
• In the transport sector – A cluster of successful policies 
are described by the concept “Avoid-Shift-Improve”. 
These include: 
(i) transportation-related land use policies, 
(ii) bus rapid transit, and 
(iii) vehicle performance standards for new light-
duty vehicles. 
The main objectives of transportation-related land 
use policies have been to increase the proximity of 
urban residents to their destination, and maximize 
the efficiency of public transportation, with the aim to 
reduce the need for private vehicles and their impacts. 
Meanwhile, bus rapid transit systems have been 
developed to reduce traffic congestion and urban air 
pollution, and vehicle performance standards to reduce 
vehicle energy use and thereby reduce passenger costs 
and enhance energy security. 
• In the forestry sector promising policies include:
(i) protected areas and other command-and-
control measures; 
(ii) economic instruments
(iii) policies affecting drivers and contexts.  
The impetus for these policies includes the preservation 
of indigenous cultures, protection of biodiversity and 
endangered species, and protection of watersheds. The 
reduction of greenhouse gas emissions is also a main 
motivating factor in some cases.   
While these policies differ substantively, they provide 
real life examples of how ambitious national or local 
policy instruments driven by priorities such as stimulating 
innovation and economic growth, bolstering national 
energy security or improving public health, can lead to 
large emission reductions. The potential for scaling up and 
replicating these policies is large and a number of common 
factors have been found to realize this potential:    
• Successful scale-up requires policy instruments to 
be tailored to local economic, financial, social and 
institutional contexts. Codes and standards have 
shown the greatest success where government-
led implementation and enforcement is generally 
accepted, particularly if market barriers make the use of 
economic instruments difficult. However, institutional 
capacity for monitoring and enforcement is also crucial 
for their effectiveness 
• National and local interests, broader than climate 
considerations, are often key drivers for successful 
policies. Focus should therefore be on adoption 
of sound climate policies as an integrated part of 
comprehensive policy packages that focus on multiple 
benefits and support national development goals.
• Successful national and local policies typically combine 
market-based instruments with regulatory approaches.
• Continuously increasing the stringency of policies, such 
as codes, standards, labels and zoning, is central for 
their sustained effectiveness in reducing emissions and 
sends important long term signals to markets.
Summing up
This report shows that the estimated emissions gap in 
2020 for a “likely” chance of staying below the 2°C target 
is large, but it is still technically possible to close this gap 
through concerted and rapid action. 
The report highlights concrete, internationally-coordinated 
ways to do so: by increasing current national reduction 
pledges to the higher end of their range, by bringing more 
ambitious pledges to the table, and by adopting strict rules 
of accounting. 
The gap can also be closed by swift and comprehensive 
action to scale up a wide range of tried-and-true policy 
actions. These are actions that have worked around the 
world and in many different sectors, and which are not 
only beneficial to climate protection, but also satisfy a great 
variety of other local and national priorities. 
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At the Conference of Parties of the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 
Durban in December, 2011, the international community 
took an important step towards enhancing action on climate 
change by agreeing to the Durban Platform. Countries 
decided to adopt by 2015 “a protocol, another legal 
instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force under the 
Convention applicable to all Parties”, to come into effect and 
be implemented beginning in 2020. 
At the same time, countries noted “with grave concern 
the significant gap between the aggregate effect of Parties’ 
mitigation pledges in terms of global annual emissions of 
greenhouse gases by 2020 and aggregate emission pathways 
consistent with having a “likely” chance of holding the 
increase in global average temperature below 2°C or 1.5°C 
above pre-industrial levels” (UNFCCC, 2011). 
The pledges and the temperature targets referred to in 
this paragraph were formally recognized in the 2010 Cancún 
Agreements (UNFCCC, 2010), and referred to one year 
earlier in the Copenhagen Accord (UNFCCC, 2009).
With the agreement of the international community to a 
temperature target and to pledges for emission reductions 
by 2020, a central question arises: “Will there be a gap in 
2020 between emissions expected after the implementation 
of pledges and the level consistent with the 2°C target?” The 
answer to this question provided by the UNEP Emissions 
Gap Report, published for the Cancún climate summit 
in December 2010, was a clear “yes”. The report clearly 
documented a substantial gap, even if pledges were fully 
implemented. 
After publishing the first Emissions Gap Report, UNEP was 
requested by policymakers to prepare a follow-up report 
which not only updated the emissions gap estimates, but also 
addressed a subsequent question: “can the emissions gap be 
bridged?” In response, the Bridging the Emissions Gap Report 
(UNEP, 2011) was released in November, 2011, before the 
Durban climate summit. This second report concluded that 
technical potential for reducing emissions by 2020 exists, and 
that this potential is large enough to bridge the emissions gap. 
Chapter 1:
Introduction
The report also noted that no significant technical or financial 
breakthroughs are required to realise this potential.
After the Bridging the Emissions Gap Report was published, 
many Parties to the UNFCCC requested an annual or semi-
annual Emissions Gap Report as an input to the global 
climate negotiations, and UNEP has subsequently made a 
commitment to prepare such a report in 2012 and at least 
over the next two to three years.
For this third report, UNEP in collaboration with the 
European Climate Foundation convened 55 scientists and 
experts from 43 scientific groups across 22 countries. The 
report specifically covers the following:
• An update of global greenhouse gas emission estimates, 
based on a number of different authoritative scientific 
sources; 
• An overview of national emission levels, both current 
(2010) and projected (2020), consistent with current 
pledges and other commitments;  
• An estimate of the level of global emissions consistent 
with the two degree target in 2020, 2030 and 2050;
• An update of the assessment of the emissions gap for 
2020;
• A review of selected examples of the rapid progress 
being made in different parts of the world to 
implement policies already leading to substantial 
emission reductions. These policies could contribute 
significantly to narrowing the gap if they are scaled up 
and replicated in other countries.
With the combination of analytical updates and new 
focal issues, this years’ report continues to provide a wealth 
of information and insights on the emissions gap and how 
it can be bridged in order to steer the world towards long-
term climate protection. The report underlines the challenge 
resulting from the current pace of mitigation efforts and notes 
that, even if the potential to bridge the gap can still realised 
at the moment, there is basically one year less to achieve 
this reduction, implying that steeper and more costly actions 
might be required to bridge the gap.
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Chapter 2:
Current and Projected 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions
2.1 Introduction
This chapter gives an overview of current and projected 
global emission estimates, to frame the analysis of both the 
emissions gap and of potential measures to close the gap. 
The chapter begins with an overview and analysis of the 
trend, size and composition of current global greenhouse gas 
emissions. This is followed by an analysis of expected global 
emissions in 2020 under a business-as-usual  scenario as well 
as under four scenario cases based on assumptions regarding 
the implementation of countries’ emission reduction pledges. 
Finally, updated information on country pledges, along with 
the most current information on national greenhouse gas 
emissions, is provided. This section also compares current 
and projected emissions and emission intensities of the G20 
countries, taking the EU as a group. Emissions are measured 
in units of carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e) for the gases 
covered by the Kyoto Protocol9 and reported under the 
UNFCCC (UNFCCC, 2002). 
9 Unless otherwise stated, all emissions in this report refer to GtCO2e 
(gigatonnes or billion tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent) – the global 
warming potential (GWP)-weighted sum of the greenhouse gases covered by 
the Kyoto Protocol, that is CO2, CH4, N2O, HFCs, PFCs and SF6. Similarly, unless 
otherwise stated, data include emissions from land use, land-use change and 
forestry (LULUCF).
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Figure 2.1. Trend in global greenhouse gas emissions 1970-2010 by sector (using Global Warming Potential  values as used for UNFCCC/
Kyoto Protocol reporting). This graph shows emissions of 50.1 GtCO2e in 2010, as derived from bottom-up emission inventories (see 
Section 2.2.1). An alternative estimate of 2010 emissions of 49 GtCO2e from the modeling groups is used elsewhere in the report.  
Source: JRC/PBL (2012) (EDGAR 4.2 FT2010)
Lead Authors: Niklas Höhne (Ecofys, Germany); Jiang Kejun (Energy Research Institute, China)
Contributing Authors: Claudine Chen (Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research, Germany); Michel den Elzen (Netherlands Environmental 
Assessment Agency, Netherlands); Claudio Gesteira (COPPE, Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil); Kelly Levin (World Resources Institute, 
USA); Steve Montzka (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, USA); Jos Olivier (Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency, 
Netherlands); Elizabeth Sawin (Climate Interactive, USA); Chris Taylor (Department of Energy and Climate Change, United Kingdom); Fabian 
Wagner (International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Austria); Zhao Xiusheng (Tsinghua University, China).
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2.2 Current and projected global emissions 
2.2.1 Current global emissions
Total greenhouse gas emissions in 2010 are estimated 
from bottom-up emission inventories to be 50.1 GtCO2e 
(with a 95% uncertainty range of between 45.6 and 54.6 
GtCO2e)10 (JRC/PBL, 2012). 
An alternative estimate of 49 GtCO2e (range 48-50) for 
2010 is provided by the modeling groups. This figure falls 
well within the uncertainty range given in the previous 
paragraph. The figure of 49 GtCO2e is used throughout the 
rest of the report since most of the report has to do with 
modeling analyses. 
Figure 2.1 shows the trend in global and sectoral 
greenhouse gas emissions from 1970 to 2010, illustrating 
the increase in global emissions over this period as well 
as the growth of energy production and conversion in the 
share of total emissions. In the period 2009-2010 emissions 
increased by 0.8 GtCO2e or 1.6% when including LULUCF-
related CO2 emissions (emissions increased by about 
3.5% when excluding LULUCF). Compared to 1990, global 
emissions including LULUCF have increased by about 30%. 
In the period 2000-2010 the increase in global emissions 
including LULUCF was around 20% (JRC/PBL, 2012).
Figure 2.2a illustrates the break-down of global greenhouse 
gas emissions in 2010 by main sectors, while Figure 2.2b 
illustrates the emissions by main sectors and gas types.
Trends for different gases are as follows: global CO2 
emissions from fossil fuel use and cement production 
declined in 2009 due to the recession, but increased sharply 
afterwards in 2010 and 2011. One study reports a 1% decline 
in 2009, 5% increase in 2010 and again a 3% increase in 2011, 
compared to the previous year, reaching an all-time high of 
34 Gt (JRC/PBL, 2012; Olivier et al., 2012). Global emissions 
from forestry and land use decreased in 2010 by about 
15%. Global emissions of CH4 and N2O increased in 2010 by 
about 0.5%, while emissions of fluorinated greenhouse gases 
increased by about 7% and are now contributing 2% to global 
total greenhouse gas emissions (see Figure 2.2b). CH
4
 and N2O 
emissions contributed 16% and 6% respectively to total CO2-
equivalent emissions in 2010. At the country level, however, 
these shares can be very different. Readers should keep in 
mind that these shares and trends are associated with some 
uncertainty (see on-line Appendix 1 for more information).
The consolidated estimate of total greenhouse gas 
emissions with its uncertainty range was prepared using 
global greenhouse gas emission inventories from various 
sources (for CO2 from IEA, EDGAR, CDIAC, EIA and national 
submissions to the UNFCCC) and updated estimates inferred 
from atmospheric measurements. 
2.2.2 Projected global “Business-as-usual ” 
emissions in 2020
Global greenhouse gas emissions are estimated to be 58 
GtCO2e (range 57 to 60 GtCO2e) in 2020 under business-
as-usual  (BaU) conditions, which is about 2 GtCO2e higher 
10 This estimate includes CO2 emissions from fossil fuel use and emissions of 
methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), and fluorinated gases (HFCs, PFCs and 
SF6), as well as CO2 emissions from forest and peat fires and related biomass 
decay.
than the BaU estimated in the Bridging the Emissions Gap 
Report (UNEP, 2011). BaU emissions were derived based on 
estimates from seven modelling groups11 that have analysed 
a selection of emission reduction proposals by countries and 
have updated their analysis recently. This data set is used in 
the remainder of this chapter.  
The range of BaU estimates is in part a result of modelling 
groups taking different, equally valid, approaches to calculate 
“business-as-usual ”. Some of the seven research groups used 
the respective BaU scenarios that the countries provided 
together with their pledge. Other groups updated the BaU for 
some countries based on new economic projections without 
taking into account climate policies. Both cases represent 
a scenario without the actions under the pledges. Other 
modelling groups considered some national policies that were 
implemented after their pledge was made. In this case, the 
BaU represents a likely pathway given currently implemented 
policies. Constructing a complete scenario of this kind for all 
countries was not possible from the available studies. Future 
Gap reports will aim to differentiate between these two cases, 
as the difference of these two assumptions is likely to become 
bigger in the future as more policies are implemented. 
The reason for the increase in estimated BaU emissions 
compared to those estimated in last year’s report is that 
some modelling groups moved their start year from 2005 
to a more recent date and because economic growth in 
emerging economies between 2005 and 2010 was higher 
than expected in 2005.
2.3 National emission reduction pledges and 
expected global emissions in 2020 as a 
result of the pledges
Since November 2011, no major economy has significantly 
changed its emission reduction pledge under the UNFCCC. 
Some countries have clarified their assumptions and 
specified the methods by which they would like emissions 
accounted for. For example, Belarus expressed their 2020 
target as a single 8% reduction compared to 1990 levels 
rather than the range 5-10%, and Kazakhstan changed their 
reference year from 1992 to 1990. South Africa and Mexico 
included a range instead of a fixed value for their BaU in 
2020, which changes their BaU-related pledges. South Korea 
updated their BaU emissions in 2020 downwards, which 
reduces estimated emission levels after implementing its 
pledge. These changes may be significant for the countries 
in question but are minor at the global level (in aggregate, 
they are smaller than 1 GtCO2e in 2020). 
The projection of global emissions in 2020 as a result of the 
pledges depends on whether the pledges are implemented 
and on the accounting rules for these pledges: 
• A “conditional” pledge depends on factors such as 
the ability of a national legislature to enact necessary 
laws, action from other countries, or the provision of 
finance or technical support. Some countries did not 
11 The modelling groups are: Climate Action Tracker by Ecofys (Climate Action 
Tracker, 2010); Climate Analytics and Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact 
Research, PIK, www.climateactiontracker.org; Climate Interactive (C-ROADS), 
www.climateinteractive.org/scoreboard; Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 
(FEEM), http://www.feem.it/; Grantham Research Institute, London School 
of Economics; OECD Environmental Outlook to 2050 (OECD 2012); PBL 
Netherlands, www.pbl.nl/en and UNEP Risoe Centre (UNEP 2012).
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attach conditions to their pledge, described here as an 
“unconditional” pledge. 
• International rules on how emission reductions are to be 
measured after the first commitment period of the Kyoto 
Protocol have not yet been defined. Accounting rules for 
emissions from land use, land-use change and forestry 
(LULUCF) for Annex I countries have now been agreed for 
a second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol 
(Grassi, 2012; UNFCCC, 2012a). However, accounting 
rules for emissions from developed countries that are 
not participating in the second commitment period of 
the Kyoto Protocol (e.g. USA and perhaps Russia, Japan, 
Canada), as well as rules for non-Annex I countries, have 
not been agreed upon. 
• In addition, rules have not been agreed for using 
surplus emissions credits, which will occur when 
countries’ actual emissions are below their emission 
reduction targets of the first commitment period of 
the Kyoto Protocol. These rules apply only to countries 
participating in a second commitment period of the 
Kyoto Protocol. The emission reduction targets for 
other countries is more uncertain under these rules. 
• Finally, there is potential “double counting”, where 
emission reductions in developing countries that are 
supported by developed countries through offsets (for 
example, using the Clean Development Mechanism) 
are counted towards meeting the pledges of both 
countries. These reductions occur only once and 
should be accounted for only towards the developed 
or the developing country, not to both. Rules on how 
to treat such potential double counting have not been 
agreed to, nor have countries agreed to avoid double 
counting. For example, some countries have stated that 
emission reductions sold to other jurisdictions will still 
be considered as meeting their pledge as well.
2.3.1 Four “cases” of expected emissions in 2020
In line with the 2010 Emissions Gap Report and Bridging 
the Emissions Gap Report (UNEP, 2010;  2011), this update 
describes four scenario cases of emissions in 2020, based 
on whether pledges are conditional, or not; and on whether 
accounting rules are strict or more lenient (see Figure 2.3). 
We define “strict” rules to mean that allowances from 
LULUCF accounting and surplus emission credits will not 
be counted towards the emission reduction pledges. Under 
“lenient” rules, these allowances can be counted as part of 
countries meeting their pledges. New in this year’s report 
compared to earlier reports is that the lenient case also 
includes an estimate for potential “double counting” of 
reductions. This additional element increases the upper limit 
of pledged emissions in the lenient case by 1.5 GtCO2e. 
Case 1 – “Unconditional pledges, lenient rules”
If countries implement their lower-ambition pledges and 
are subject to “lenient” accounting rules, then the median 
estimate of annual greenhouse gas emissions in 2020 is 57 
GtCO2e, within a range of 56-5712 GtCO2e. 
12 Ranges in this report are 20th – 80th percentile unless stated otherwise (see 
glossary for definition of 20th – 80th percentile).
Case 2 – “Unconditional pledges, strict rules”
This case occurs if countries keep to their lower-ambition 
pledges, but are subject to “strict” accounting rules. In this 
case, the median estimate of emissions in 2020 is 54 GtCO2e, 
within a range of 54-55 GtCO2e. 
Case 3 – “Conditional pledges, lenient rules”
Some countries offered to be more ambitious with their 
pledges, but linked that to various conditions described 
previously. If the more ambitious conditional pledges are 
taken into account, but accounting rules are “lenient”, 
median estimates of emissions in 2020 are 55 GtCO2e within 
a range of 54-56 GtCO2e. 
Case 4 – “Conditional pledges, strict rules”
If countries adopt higher-ambition pledges and are also 
subject to “strict” accounting rules, the median estimate of 
emissions in 2020 is 52 GtCO2e, within a range of 51-52 GtCO2e. 
2.3.2 Land use, land-use change and forestry 
(LULUCF): an update
Under the Kyoto Protocol, developed countries (Annex 
I Parties) may receive credits or debits from LULUCF 
activities dependent on a series of complex LULUCF 
accounting rules that contribute to the achievement of their 
individual emission reduction targets. In the Durban climate 
negotiations, countries agreed to new LULUCF accounting 
rules for countries participating in the second commitment 
period (CP2) of the Kyoto Protocol. One study (Grassi et 
al., 2012) found that the potential contribution of LULUCF 
accounting under these new rules is relatively modest (a 
difference of up to about 2% of 1990 emissions between 
strict and lenient accounting) for the Annex I Parties that 
joined the first commitment period (2008-2012) of the Kyoto 
Protocol as a whole. We have used a value of 0.3 GtCO2e in 
the lenient case, assuming that all Annex I countries adopt 
the new rules. This value may be an underestimate, given 
that Russia, USA, Canada and Japan may adopt different 
accounting practices outside the Kyoto Protocol.
2.3.3 Surplus Assigned Amount Units (AAUs): an 
update
Countries with actual emission levels below their emission 
target at the end of the first commitment period of the Kyoto 
Protocol will have surplus Assigned Amount Units (AAUs) 
or other emission credits. Under the Kyoto Protocol, these 
surplus credits may effectively be carried from the first to a 
following commitment period. In the climate negotiations, 
various options for addressing carry-over and sale of surplus 
AAUs have been put forward. One study (den Elzen et al., 
2012a) analysed the effect of some of these options on 
the reduction pledges for 2020, taking into account the 
estimated credits from the Clean Development Mechanism, 
Joint Implementation projects, and land-use activities 
for the first commitment period. Under the assumption 
of gradually increasing usage of first commitment period 
surplus units between now and 2020, and a maximum carry-
over of about 14 GtCO2e 13, effective target levels by 2020 
13 Point Carbon (2012) found a similar estimate of net AAU surplus of about 13 
GtCO2e.
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will be reduced by between 0 and 3.5 GtCO2e, depending on 
the accounting rules for surplus units  and the willingness of 
Parties to purchase them. Using carry-over of surplus units 
at equal amounts each year would halve this impact. Russia 
potentially has a large surplus from the first commitment 
period of the Kyoto Protocol, but has indicated it will not 
join a second commitment period and has not submitted a 
target under the Kyoto Protocol14, which would mean that 
these allowances would not be available to other countries. 
Excluding Russia from the analysis, total surplus units by 2020 
are projected to vary between 0 and 1.8 GtCO2e (den Elzen 
et al., 2012b). Accordingly, we have used the estimate of 1.8 
GtCO2e in the lenient case, to show the maximum impact 
that would occur if all surplus credits were purchased by 
countries with pledges that do require emission reductions, 
displacing mitigation action in those countries.
2.3.4 The potential impact of use of offsets
The potential effect of the use of offsets can only be 
calculated roughly. A recent study (Erickson et al., 2011) 
estimates offsets to account for as much as 1.6 GtCO2e. In 
addition, there is a risk that more offset credits are generated 
than emissions are actually reduced. Project activities need 
to be “additional” to the expected development without the 
project. Such comparison with a hypothetical case is difficult 
and there is indeed evidence that a significant share of CDM 
projects is not additional (Haya, 2009). Assuming this share 
to be 25% by 2020, we estimate that up to 0.4 GtCO2e of 
offsets could be non-additional, raising the total estimate of 
the magnitude of offsets to 2.0 GtCO2e. However, the effects 
of LULUCF accounting, surplus allowances, and use of offsets 
are only additive as long as there is demand for them, that 
is, as long as Annex I countries need to reduce emissions 
further. Hence, we assumed that the use of offsets (double 
14 http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/ad_hoc_working_groups/kp/application/
pdf/tableqelrcs_fromparties_for_website_posting_17aug2012_cln.pdf
counting and non-additionality) could lead to an increase 
of the upper limit of allowed emission in the order of 1.5 
GtCO2e in the lenient case at the global level.
2.3.5 Updated BaUs and updates on the use of 
offsets increases pledge case emissions
The updated emissions for the four pledge cases are around 
1 to 2 GtCO2e higher compared to last year’s Bridging the 
Emissions Gap Report (UNEP, 2011), which is due to various 
factors. For example, this year’s report only includes recently 
updated studies in the analysis. These studies include the 
high recent and projected emissions growth following recent 
global macroeconomic trends. The older studies that are 
not included in this year’s assessment had lower economic 
growth. The additional effects of the use of offsets of 1.5 
GtCO2e in the lenient cases were also included. This has a 
limited effect on case 1 (lenient, unconditional) because in this 
case the required reductions by Annex I countries as a group 
are already quite limited. The use of offsets, however, has 
enlarged the difference between case 3 (lenient, conditional) 
and case 4 (strict, conditional) to 3 GtCO2e.
2.4 Current and projected national emissions
This section provides a detailed overview of the pledges 
submitted by countries, along with information on their 
current greenhouse gas emissions. In addition, it compares 
the emissions and pledges of G20 countries, treating the 
European Union (EU27) as a group. The figures put the 
pledges in perspective with historical trends and on a unit of 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and per capita basis.
2.4.1 Sectoral shares of emissions influence the 
formulation of national pledges
The sectoral shares of national greenhouse gas emissions 
vary substantially among countries (see Figure 2.4). Countries 
usually take into account this sectoral distribution in the 
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Figure 2.3. Emissions in 2020 under BaU and as a result of pledges under four cases. Note: to ensure a consistent comparison of 
the pathways and pledges we have harmonized the data to the same 2005 emissions of 45 GtCO2e (except Grantham where values 
for 2005 were not collected).
14 The Emissions Gap Report 2012 – Current and Projected Greenhouse Gas Emissions
Pledges formulated in terms of GHG emissions Submitted actions No pledge
Figure 2.5. Pledge map: Countries classified according to type of pledge16
16 Current international borders
formulation of their pledges. In general, developed countries’ 
emissions are dominated by energy-related fuel combustion, 
accounting for 65% to 85% of the national total15. For these 
countries energy efficiency and low carbon energy sources are 
major mitigation options. Other countries’ emissions profiles 
are dominated by agriculture and forestry, making reductions 
in these sectors more important. In addition, they have the 
opportunity in their development choices to avoid the high 
use of fossil fuels characterising many developed countries. 
Some countries have unique emissions profiles, with Russia 
15 Notable exceptions are Iceland (9%), New Zealand (45%) and Finland (50%).
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 * Power generation, refineries, coke ovens.
 ** Including non-combustion CO2 from limestone use and from non-energy use of fuels and N2O from chemicals production.
Figure 2.4. Sectoral shares of national greenhouse gas emissions in 2010 for countries included in the G20 with a pledge,  
taking European Union as a group. Source: JRC/PBL (2012); EDGAR 4.2 FT2010. 
having a high share of fugitive emissions from natural gas 
production and Brazil with a very high share from forestry.
2.4.2 An overview of pledges and current 
greenhouse gas emissions by country
Figure 2.5 provides a map of pledges by country. The 
countries shown on the map have been grouped into three 
categories: those that have made an emission reduction 
proposal for 2020 defined in terms of greenhouse gas 
emissions; countries that have submitted actions, e.g., 
15The Emissions Gap Report 2012 – Current and Projected Greenhouse Gas Emissions
Table 2.1. Pledges (unconditional and conditional) as interpreted for this report, current emissions and share of global emissions for 
countries that formulated pledges in terms of greenhouse gas emissions (countries presented in alphabetical order, current emissions 
rounded to 1 Mt, share of global emissions indicated with two significant digits).
Country Unconditional pledge Conditional pledge Current 
emissions 
(MtCO2e 2010)
Share of global 
emissions (% world 
total 2010)
Antigua and 
Barbuda
Reduce emissions by 25% below 
1990 level by 2020
- 1 0.0010
Australia Reduce emissions by 5% below 
2000 level by 2020
Reduce emissions by 25% below 
2000 level by 2020
629 1.3
Belarus Reduce emissions by 8% below 
1990 level by 2020
- 150 0.30
Brazil Reduce emissions by 36.1% to 
38.9% below BaU by 2020
- 1621 3.2
Canada No unconditional pledge, BaU 
emissions growth assumed
Reduce emissions by 17% below 
2005 level by 2020
728 1.5
Chile 20% reduction below the BaU in 
2020, as projected from 2007 
- 107 0.21
China Lower CO2 emissions per unit 
of GDP by 40-45% by 2020 
compared to the 2005 level; 
increase share of non-fossil fuels 
in primary energy consumption 
to around 15% by 2020; increase 
forest coverage by 40 million 
hectares and forest stock volume 
by 1.3 billion cubic meters by 
2020 from 2005 levels 
- 11182 22
Costa Rica None, assumed to follow  BaU 
trajectory
Carbon neutrality by 2021 11 0.022
Croatia Reduce emissions by 5% below 
1990 level by 2020
- 31 0.062
EU27 Reduce emissions by 20% below 
1990 level by 2020
Reduce emissions by 30% below 
1990 level by 2020 
4999 10
Iceland Reduce emissions by 15% below 
1990 level by 2020
Reduce emissions by 30% below 
1990 level by 2020
23 0.046
India Reduce emission intensity of 
GDP by 20 to 25% by 2020 in 
comparison to the 2005 level 
- 2692 5.4
Indonesia Reduce emissions by 26% on BaU 
by 2020
Reduce emissions by 41% on 
BaU by 2020 (government 
announcement, not an official 
pledge)17
1946 3.9
Israel Reduce emissions by 20% on BaU 
by 2020
- 79 0.16
Japan No unconditional pledge, BaU 
emissions growth assumed
Reduce emissions by 25% below 
1990 level by 2020
1379 2.8
Kazakhstan Reduce emissions by 15% below 
1990 level by 2020
- 318 0.63
17
17 Indonesia’s high case commitment of 41% is not included in the Copenhagen Accord but was announced prior to COP15 by the President of Indonesia. The impact 
of this pledge is included in the two conditional pledge cases presented in this Chapter.
energy targets or proposed projects; and finally, countries 
that have not made pledges.
Table 2.1 provides an overview of the pledges, 
unconditional and conditional, submitted by countries 
under the Copenhagen Accord and the Cancún Agreements. 
Included are those pledges that are formulated in terms 
of greenhouse gas emissions. Details of the evaluation for 
the G20 countries are included in the on-line Appendix 2. 
For each country, the table gives information on current 
emissions and share of global emissions. The table shows 
the classification of pledges as used in this report. It should 
be noted that the pledges are not directly comparable. 
The table illustrates the potential significance of the 
pledges in reducing global emissions: countries listed here 
account for around 80% of global emissions (including 
LULUCF emissions) and include major emitters. Only these 
pledges are used to calculate the emission levels of cases 
1 to 4. 
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Country Unconditional pledge Conditional pledge Current 
emissions 
(MtCO2e 2010)
Share of global 
emissions (% world 
total 2010)
Korea (South) Reduce emissions by 30% below 
BaU by 2020
- 647 1.3
Liechtenstein Mirrors the EU pledge Mirrors  the EU pledge Not available Not available
Maldives None, assumed to follow  BaU 
trajectory
Reduce net emissions to zero 
by 2020
1 0.0015
Marshall 
lslands
Reduce emissions by 40% below 
2009 levels by 2020
- Not available Not available
Mexico Emissions reductions through to 
2012 in line with Special Climate 
Change Programme. Estimated to 
deliver 51MtCO2e reduction on 
BaU in 2020  
Reduce emissions by 30% below 
business-as- usual in 2020
661 1.3
Moldova Reduce emissions by 25% below 
1990 by 2020
- 11 0.023
Monaco Reduce emissions by 30% below 
1990 level by 2020 
- Not available Not available
Montenegro Reduce emissions by 20% below 
1990 by 2020
- Not available Not available
New Zealand Reduce emissions by 10% below 
1990 level by 2020
Reduce emissions by 20% below 
1990 level by 2020
80 0.16
Norway Reduce emissions by 30% below 
1990 level by 2020
Reduce emissions by 40% below 
1990 level by 2020
67 0.13
Papua New 
Guinea
Reduce emissions by at least 50% 
below BaU by 2030
- 43 0.085
Russian 
Federation
Reduce emissions by 15% below 
1990 level by 2020
Reduce emissions by 25% below 
1990 level by 2020
2510 5.0
Singapore None, assumed to follow  BaU 
trajectory
Reduce emissions by 16% below 
BaU by 2020
50 0.10
South Africa None, assumed to follow BaU 
trajectory
Reduce emissions by 34% below 
BaU by 2020
422 0.84
Switzerland Mirrors the EU pledge Mirrors  the EU pledge 57 0.12
Ukraine Reduce emissions by 20% below 
1990 level by 2020
- 397 0.79
United States 
of America
No unconditional pledge, BaU 
emissions growth assumed
Reduce emissions by 17% below 
2005 level by 2020
6715 13
Source: Country pledge information from UNFCCC ( 2012b), data on current emissions and their share of global emissions including LULUCF from JRC/PBL (2012) (EDGAR 4.2 
FT2010), http://edgar.jrc.ec.europa.eu/overview.php  
Table 2.1. Continued
Table 2.2 provides an overview of the current emissions 
and share of global emissions of countries not listed in Table 
2.1 but which  have submitted policy-, sectoral-, and project- 
level actions. These pledges are not included in cases 1 to 
4. Table 2.3 provides an overview of countries without a 
pledge. The total share of global emissions of the countries 
included in Table 2.2 and Table 2.3 is around 20%.
Table 2.2. Current emissions and share of global emissions of countries that have submitted policy-, sectoral-, and project- level actions 
(not formulated in terms of greenhouse gas emissions). Countries presented in alphabetical order, current emissions rounded to 1 Mt, 
share of global emissions indicated with two significant digits.
Country Current emissions (MtCO2e 2010)
Share of global emissions  
(% world total 2010)
Afghanistan 18 0.035
Algeria 169 0.34
Argentina 315 0.63
Armenia 11 0.023
Benin 47 0.093
Bhutan 9 0.019
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Country Current emissions (MtCO2e 2010)
Share of global emissions  
(% world total 2010)
Botswana 12 0.023
Cambodia 192 0.38
Cameroon 82 0.16
Central African Republic 512 1.0
Chad 33 0.065
Colombia 187 0.37
Congo, Democratic Republic of 1113 2.2
Côte d’Ivoire 165 0.33
Egypt 276 0.55
Eritrea 5 0.010
Ethiopia 110 0.22
Gabon 22 0.043
Georgia 13 0.026
Ghana 86 0.17
Jordan 25 0.049
Macedonia 12 0.024
Madagascar 43 0.086
Mauritania 12 0.023
Mauritius 3 0.0067
Mongolia 70 0.14
Morocco 78 0.16
Peru 76 0.15
San Marino Not available Not available
Sierra Leone 10 0.020
Tajikistan 15 0.029
Togo 23 0.047
Tunisia 38 0.08
Source: Country information from UNFCCC (UNFCCC, 2011), data on current emissions and their share of global emissions including LULUCF from JRC/PBL (2012) (EDGAR 4.2 
FT2010): http://edgar.jrc.ec.europa.eu/overview.php
Table 2.2. Continued
Table 2.3 Current emissions and share of global emissions (alphabetical order) of countries with no pledges with shares of global 
emissions larger than 0.1% (countries presented in alphabetical order, current emissions rounded to 1 Mt, share of global emissions 
indicated with two significant digits).
Country
Current emissions  
(MtCO2e 2010)
Share of global emissions  
(% world total 2010)
Azerbaijan 50 0.10
Bangladesh 184 0.37
Bolivia 144 0.29
Cuba 58 0.12
Ecuador 54 0.11
Guinea 230 0.46
Iraq 191 0.38
Islamic Republic of Iran 528 1.1
Kenya 56 0.11
Kuwait 101 0.20
Lao, People’s Democratic Republic 100 0.20
Libya 79 0.16
Malaysia 330 0.66
Mali 50 0.10
Myanmar 362 0.72
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Country
Current emissions  
(MtCO2e 2010)
Share of global emissions  
(% world total 2010)
Nigeria 215 0.43
North Korea 96 0.19
Oman 82 0.16
Pakistan 340 0.68
Philippines 159 0.32
Qatar 112 0.22
Saudi Arabia 495 0.99
Serbia and Montenegro 82 0.16
Sudan 195 0.39
Syrian Arab Republic 68 0.14
Thailand 413 0.82
Trinidad and Tobago 57 0.11
Turkey 420 0.84
Turkmenistan 87 0.17
Uganda 58 0.11
United Arab Emirates 207 0.41
United Republic of Tanzania 70 0.14
Uzbekistan 174 0.35
Venezuela 310 0.62
Vietnam 306 0.61
Zambia 77 0.15
Source: JRC/PBL (2012) (EDGAR 4.2 FT2010): http://edgar.jrc.ec.europa.eu/overview.php 
Table 2.3. Continued
2.5 Comparison of current and expected 
emissions and emission intensities in 
2020 for G20 countries with a pledge
Figure 2.6, Figure 2.7 and Figure 2.8 provide a comparison 
of the emissions of countries included in the G20 with a 
pledge, treating the European Union as a group. The figures 
put the pledges in perspective with historical trends and on 
a unit of GDP and per capita basis.
In terms of absolute emissions, most developed countries 
propose to reduce emissions by 2020 below the current 
level (2010), with the exception of Russia (see Figure 2.7). 
Developing countries generally propose to slow the speed 
of growth of emissions. The BaU provided by the countries 
themselves is often at the high end of the BaUs used by 
the modelling groups. Developing countries usually have 
higher emissions per unit of GDP than developed countries, 
in particular if the share of forestry emissions is high, as 
in Brazil and Indonesia. If pledges were complied with, 
emissions per unit of GDP would be reduced significantly 
for all countries. Countries like India and China have used 
this metric for the formulation of their pledge. The striking 
decrease in greenhouse gas emissions per unit of GDP for 
China from 1990 to 2010 reflects the considerable degree 
to which China has managed to decouple greenhouse gas 
emissions from economic growth during this period.
Countries with very high per capita emissions (e.g. 
Australia, Canada and USA) reduce emissions per capita 
significantly under their pledge, but they still stay high 
compared to other countries (Figure 2.8). 
2.6 Summary
The sections above highlight that greenhouse gas 
emissions continue to increase. Estimated BaU emissions 
as well as emissions under each of the four pledge cases 
for 2020 are now estimated to be 1-2 GtCO2e higher as 
compared to last year’s Bridging the Emissions Gap Report. 
These increases are due to various factors, including that the 
studies incorporated this year have updated BaU estimates 
that take into account the recent increase in economic 
growth rates by emerging economies and have adopted a 
later start year. The update of the potential implications of 
the use of offsets also affects the calculations, particularly 
between the conditional-lenient and conditional-strict 
cases. It is noteworthy that the assumptions of strict versus 
lenient rules have larger implications for the estimated 
emissions in 2020 than the implementation of conditional 
versus unconditional pledges. Going from unconditional 
to conditional pledge assumptions results in a reduction in 
emissions of 2 GtCO2e, whereas going from lenient to strict 
rules reduces emissions by 3 GtCO2e18. 
18 These are the differences of two rounded values. They actually may be 
somewhat higher or lower if the original values rather than rounded values 
are used to compute the difference.
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Figure 2.7. Year 1990, 2005, 2010 and 2020 greenhouse gas emissions per unit of GDP for G20 countries that have made pledges. 
Note that European Union countries are taken as a group. For emissions, see Figure 2.6. Sources: GDP, Purchasing Power Parity 
(PPP) data; World Bank (2012). 
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Figure 2.6. Year 1990, 2005, 2010 and 2020 greenhouse gas emissions for G20 countries that have made pledges. Note that 
European Union countries are taken as a group. Source: JRC/PBL (2012); Government of Brazil (2010); Indonesia Ministry of 
Environment (2010); Mexico The Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources (2009); South Africa Department of Environmental 
Affairs (2011); South Korea Ministry of Land and Environment Protection (2000).
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Figure 2.8. Year 1990, 2005, 2010 and 2020 greenhouse gas emissions per capita for G20 countries that have made pledges. 
Note that European Union countries are taken as a group. For emissions, see figure 2.6. Source: UN medium population numbers;  
UN (2011). 
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3.1 Introduction
This chapter updates the estimate of the emissions gap 
presented in the 2011 Bridging the Emissions Gap Report 
(UNEP, 2011) and presents new information about this gap. 
The “emissions gap” is the difference in 2020 between the 
level of global emissions consistent with climate targets and 
projected emissions. The projected emissions are calculated 
in Chapter 2 of this report. The climate targets considered in 
this report are the 2°C and 1.5 °C targets or limits recognised 
in December 2010 at the annual Conference of Parties of the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) in Cancún, Mexico.  
The Conference “recognizes that deep cuts in global 
greenhouse gas emissions are required ...so as to hold the 
increase in global average temperature below 2°C above 
pre-industrial levels..., [and also] recognizes the need to 
consider... strengthening the long-term global goal on the 
basis of the best available scientific knowledge, including 
in relation to a global average temperature rise of 1.5°C” 
(UNFCCC, 2010).
The chapter first briefly describes the scenarios that are 
analysed, and then identifies the emission levels in 2020 
and other timescales that are consistent with a 2°C or 1.5°C 
temperature limit. The emission levels of these scenarios in 
2020 are then compared to projected 2020 emission levels 
in order to assess the “gap”. The implications of the gap and 
of other types of scenarios are then discussed.
3.2 Which scenarios are analysed? 
The scientific literature documents many different 
emission scenarios that have temperature paths staying 
below an increase of 2°C or 1.5°C compared to pre-industrial 
conditions. In general, we know from the literature that 
there are many feasible pathways and options for staying 
below specific global temperature targets. One reason for 
this diversity is that most of these scenarios are computed 
by integrated assessment models (Box 3.1) which have 
different representations of socio-economic driving forces 
of emissions and different ways of portraying the chemistry 
and physics of the atmosphere. Therefore they each 
generate quite different emission scenarios that meet the 
same climate target. 
Despite their diversity, the scenarios used in this chapter 
to compute the emissions gap have two things in common. 
First, they comply with either the 2°C or 1.5°C targets. 
Second, they are least cost scenarios (Box 3.2)  and depict 
trends in global emissions up to 2100 under the assumption 
that climate targets will be met by the cheapest combination 
of policies and measures considered in a particular model. 
They further assume that actions begin “immediately”, that 
is, in the specified base year of model calculations. Another 
type, called later action scenarios in this report, also limit 
greenhouse gas emissions to levels consistent with 2°C, but 
assume less short-term mitigation and thus higher emissions 
in the near term. Only at a point later than the base year do 
these scenarios introduce a least cost mitigation pathway to 
meet the global climate target19. 
Each of the scenarios has a particular trajectory of 
emissions through time. The reason a particular trajectory 
stays within a temperature target in the long term is because 
they stay within a certain limit of cumulative emissions 
over time. The amount of cumulative emissions has been 
found to be a good proxy for global temperature; the higher 
the cumulative emissions, the higher the level at which 
temperature stabilizes in the atmosphere (e.g., Allen et 
19 These later action scenarios do not necessarily assume a complete absence 
of action in the near term; rather, they assume that near term action 
combined with more stringent action later (more stringent than in least cost 
scenarios) will successfully meet the 2°C target (for example, post-2020). The 
few currently available examples of these scenarios are evaluated later in the 
chapter.
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The IPCC defines Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs) as “models that combine results and concepts from the 
physical, biological, economic and social sciences. They are used to model the interactions between these components in 
a consistent framework to evaluate the status and the consequences of environmental change and the policy responses 
to it” (IPCC, 2007a).
IAMs incorporate two main sets of factors determining the extent of climate change: the development of key socio-
economic driving forces, and the physics and chemistry of the climate system. These two sets of factors at a minimum 
are needed to explore how society can move from a business-as-usual emissions path to a path which would limit global 
temperature increase to a certain target (in the case of this report, to below 2°C or 1.5°C). Several key socio-economic 
driving forces determine the future trajectory of emissions of greenhouse gases and other substances (e.g. aerosols). 
These driving forces include assumptions about economic growth, demographic change, technological development, 
consumer preferences and the introduction of climate policy. The physics and chemistry of the climate system determine 
how changes in emissions lead to changes in global average temperature. 
Box 3.1  Integrated Assessment Models for Climate Change Assessments
al., 2009; Matthews et al., 2009; Meinshausen et al., 2009; 
Solomon et al., 2009; Zickfeld et al., 2009; Solomon et al., 
2010; Bowerman et al., 2011; Smith et al., 2012). 
Since two different trajectories can have the same 
cumulative emissions, this means that two or more trajectories 
can also meet a particular temperature target. That is why in 
this report we have identified 64 different scenarios that stay 
within the 2°C target with at least a 50% likelihood of success. 
But it also means that if emissions are somewhat higher at the 
beginning of the trajectory, they have to be lower at the end, 
and vice versa. This is called “intertemporal dependence” of 
emission trajectories. As an example, an emission trajectory 
Least cost scenarios are those computed by IAMs that identify the least expensive combination of mitigation options 
to fulfil a specific climate target. A least cost scenario is based on the premise that, if an overarching climate objective is 
set, society wants to achieve this at the lowest possible costs over time. It also assumes that global actions start at the 
base year of model simulations (usually close to the current year) and are implemented following a “cost-optimal” (cost-
efficient) sharing of the mitigation burden between current and future generations depending on the social discount 
rate. This rate is a measure to help to guide choices about the value of diverting funds to social projects.
When creating such a least cost scenario, the model user can usually choose whether, when, how much, where, in 
which region, and through which available technology emission reductions are achieved. The model usually spreads 
mitigation efforts over all options and emission sources so that no mitigation option is neglected. The choices made by 
the model depend on the options selected by the user, whether these options are available in the model, how much 
they cost, what their mitigation potential is, the geographic coverage and amount of spatial detail of the model, and 
other factors. With this approach each IAM will provide a unique solution (i.e. combination of mitigation actions) for 
achieving a climate target. Because each model has a different representation of socio-economic driving forces and the 
physics and chemistry of the climate system (see Box 3.1), this approach results in at least as many solutions as there 
are models.
Least cost scenarios cluster into two general groups – those that assume that all the mitigation options (specified in an 
IAM model) can be selected during a particular model run, and those that place restrictions on the technical potential 
of an option, assuming for example that nuclear power is phased out during this century or that only half the potential 
of bioenergy is available because using more could demand too much of the world’s agricultural areas. In this report, 
however, we do not distinguish between these two types when we present results. 
Although IAMs address the costs of mitigating emissions, they (usually) do not cover the economic and social costs of 
the impacts of climate change. Therefore a typical but incorrect conclusion is that a scenario without mitigation actions 
is less costly than an equivalent scenario with them. In reality, the opposite may be true – a scenario without mitigation 
actions may have higher net costs because of the high losses and damage due to climate impacts (for example, lower 
crop production and more frequent coastal and river flooding) and because of the considerable costs necessary to adapt 
to climate change. 
Box 3.2 What are Least Cost Scenarios?
that follows the top boundary of the “below 2°C” range (green 
range) in Figure 3.1, will result in a temperature increase 
which actually exceeds 2°C. To stay below 2°C, an emissions 
trajectory that starts at the top of the range must migrate to a 
lower part of the range. Conversely, a trajectory starting near 
the bottom of the range can move towards the top and still 
stay within the 2°C target. 
It is important to note that the scenarios evaluated 
in this report were not explicitly generated to produce 
trajectories that stay below 2°C or 1.5°C. Rather, they were 
based on different climate targets such as greenhouse gas 
concentration levels, cumulative emissions over time, or 
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radiative forcing.  All these metrics are valid indicators for 
how to avoid “dangerous anthropogenic interference in 
the climate system”, as stated in the Climate Convention 
(UNFCCC, 1992). 
More details about the scenarios are given in Box 3.3. 
3.3 Emission levels in 2020, 2030 and 2050 for 
the 2°C target
To analyse the least cost scenarios, we bring them into a 
common analytical framework and estimate the probability 
of each scenario exceeding 2°C and 1.5°C of warming.  A 
probabilistic approach is important because of the great 
uncertainties of climate sensitivity (roughly speaking, the 
response of global temperature to additional greenhouse 
gas emissions) (Knutti and Hegerl, 2008) and transient 
climate response20. Temperature ranges are projected 
using the probabilistic carbon-cycle and climate model 
MAGICC21(Meinshausen et al., 2011a) in a setup that closely 
simulates the global temperature response to  greenhouse 
gas emissions of the most complex climate models (Rogelj 
et al., 2012) as assessed  in the Fourth Assessment Report 
20 According to the IPCC, transient climate response is a measure of the 
strength and rapidity of the surface temperature response to greenhouse gas 
forcing.
21 The setup of the climate model has been updated from the 2011 Bridging 
the Emissions Gap Report. Until now, the setup described in Meinshausen et 
al. (2009) was used. Here we use the setup presented in Rogelj et al. (2012), 
which is basically an extension of the work described in Meinshausen et al. 
(2009), to represent more closely the uncertainties in climate sensitivity in 
line with the assessment of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC, 2007b) and take into account the latest historical emission estimates 
from the Representative Concentration Pathway (RCP) exercise (Meinshausen 
et al., 2011b).
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Figure 3.1: Ranges of pathways limiting global temperature increase with a “likely” (>66%) chance of staying below various 
temperature limits (top panel). Time slices of the ranges are shown in the bottom panel for 2020, 2030, and 2050 global total 
emissions, respectively. The small box around 2020 in the upper diagram indicates the emission levels consistent with the current 
pledges as assessed in Chapter 2.
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(AR4) of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC, 2007b). The methodology used for this analysis is 
described in more detail in UNEP (2010); Rogelj et al. (2011) 
and UNEP (2011). 
The results here are not fundamentally different from 
those presented in the Bridging the Emissions Gap Report 
(UNEP, 2011). Emission scenarios in our set consistent with 
a “likely” chance of  meeting the 2°C target do not exceed 
44 GtCO2e/yr (with a range of 41-47 GtCO2e/yr) in 2020 (see 
Figure 3.1 and Table 3.1). In this and previous emission gap 
reports we define a “likely” chance as having a greater than 
66% probability. For a less stringent “medium” chance (50 
to 66 %), emission levels in 2020 can be somewhat higher at 
46 GtCO2e/yr (range 44-48 GtCO2e/yr). Global emissions in 
these scenarios peak before 2020 or earlier. 
Beyond 2020, emissions in 2030 do not exceed 37 GtCO2e/
yr (range 33-44) in the scenarios that have a “likely” chance 
of staying below the 2°C target. For a “medium” chance of 
staying below 2°C, 2030 emissions do not exceed 41 GtCO2e/
yr (range 39-46). 
Emissions in 2050 consistent with a “likely” chance of being 
on a pathway to stay below 2°C do not exceed 21 GtCO2e/yr 
(range 18-25). For a “medium” chance, the 2050 emissions 
level is 27 GtCO2e/yr (range 24-29). 
The larger ranges in 2030 illustrate that there is some 
flexibility in the exact timing of emission reductions, and the 
differences in assumptions between the different models 
play a role here. Nevertheless, there is agreement among the 
models that substantial emission reductions are required by 
2050, and higher short-term emissions will have to be offset 
by steeper and deeper reductions later.
3.4 The emissions gap for the 2°C target
The “emissions gap” in 2020 is calculated by working out 
the difference between global emissions consistent with the 
2°C target and expected emissions. 
Figure 3.2 shows that the emissions gap compared to 
the Bridging the Gap Report has increased by about 1 to 2 
GtCO2e/yr for the pledge cases and by about 2 GtCO2e/yr for 
the business-as-usual case (BaU). Reasons for this are given 
in Chapter 2.
The emissions gap in 2020 between BaU emissions and 
the emissions level consistent with a “likely” chance of 
staying within the 2°C target (44 GtCO2e/yr) is 14 GtCO2e/
yr. The gaps between the four pledge cases and a “likely” 
chance of staying within the 2°C target are as follows:
• Case 1 – “Unconditional pledges, lenient rules” = 13 
GtCO2e/yr (range 9-16 GtCO2e/yr)
• Case 2 – “Unconditional pledges, strict rules” = 10 
GtCO2e/yr (range 7-14 GtCO2e/yr)
• Case 3 – “Conditional pledges, lenient rules” = 11 
GtCO2e/yr (range 7-15 GtCO2e/yr)
• Case 4 – “Conditional pledges, strict rules” = 8 GtCO2e/
yr (range 4-11 GtCO2e/yr)
Since the first UNEP Emissions Gap Report (UNEP, 2010), 
there has been  a significant increase in the smallest estimate 
of the emissions gap for 2°C, from 5 to 8 GtCO2e/yr for Case 
4. The maximum gap extent, (Case 1) has increased from 7 
to 13 GtCO2e/yr. These increases stem from higher estimates 
of emission levels implied by the pledges, based on more 
elaborate analysis made possible by countries clarifying the 
meaning of their pledges. The median emission levels in line 
with a “likely” chance of staying below 2°C have not changed 
since the 2010 report (UNEP, 2010).
3.5 Results for a 1.5°C target
The previous section showed that pledges are far from able 
to close the emissions gap in 2020 or to lead to a pathway 
to stay within the 2°C target. However, as noted above, the 
Cancún Accord also makes provision for a possible 1.5°C 
target. From the set of 290 emission scenarios considered 
in this report, only five meet the 1.5°C target by 2100. These 
For this report, we re-analyse a large set (n = 290) of emission scenarios from the literature. In addition to the 
scenarios assessed in the Bridging the Gap report (UNEP, 2011), this year’s report includes further scenarios from 
the Asian Modelling Exercise (Calvin et al., 2012) and the Global Energy Assessment (Riahi et al., 2012). Based on the 
assessment of current emissions in Chapter 2, scenarios with total greenhouse gas emissions in 2010 outside the 45.5 
– 54.5 GtCO2e/yr range were excluded (this affected 24 scenarios). Emissions are reported in units of annual gigatonnes 
of carbon dioxide equivalent (GtCO2e/yr). Carbon dioxide equivalents of non-CO2 gases are computed from the 100-year 
global warming potentials used by the UNFCCC (UNFCCC, 2002).
The emission estimates from different scenarios are harmonized to historical emission inventories by setting a 
common value for 2005, using the methodology from the Bridging the Gap report (UNEP, 2011). For the estimates of the 
emissions gap we include the emissions of greenhouse gases from the Kyoto Protocol. Although not explicitly included 
in the numerical estimates of the gap, model calculations also take into account the effect of a number of air pollutants 
that have an important impact on climate change, including sulphur dioxide (SO2), black carbon (BC), organic carbon 
(OC) and tropospheric ozone with its precursors. Two of these, SO2 and OC, have a cooling rather than warming effect on 
the atmosphere. We assume in our scenarios that the emissions and impact on global temperature of these substances 
will be gradually reduced over this century in line with a low-carbon future because of national air pollution reduction 
programmes (Meinshausen et al., 2011b; van Vuuren et al., 2011). We include their impact on global temperature using 
the same approach as in previous emission gap reports (UNEP, 2010; Rogelj et al., 2011; UNEP, 2011).
Box 3.3 Details about the scenarios analysed in this chapter
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Figure 3.2 Summary of the gaps that result from four different interpretations of how the pledges are followed, and for a “likely” 
(greater than 66%) and a “medium” (50-66%) chance of staying below 2°C.
BaU Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4
What is the expected “gap” for a 
“likely” chance of staying below 2°C? 
(In parenthesis - figure of the 2011 
assessment)
Median gap
(GtCO2e)
14
(12)
13
(11)
10
(9)
11
(9)
8
(6)
Gap Range
(GtCO2e)
10-19
(9-18)
9-16
(7-16)
7-14
(6-14)
7-15
(6-14)
4-11
(3-11)
What is the expected “gap” for a 
“medium” chance of staying below 
2°C? (In parenthesis - figure of the 
2011 assessment)
Median gap
(GtCO2e)
12
(10)
11
(9)
8
(7)
9
(7)
6
(4)
Gap range
(GtCO2e)
9-16
(6-14)
8-13
(4-12)
6-11
(3-10)
6-12
(3-10)
3-8
(0-7)
Table 3.1: Overview of emissions in 2020, 2030 and 2050 of pathways with a “likely” (greater than 66 %) or a “medium” (50 to 66 %) 
chance of limiting global temperature increase to below 2°C during the 21st century, respectively.
Number of 
pathways
Peaking 
decade*
Total GHG emissions 
in 2020
Total GHG emissions 
in 2030
Total GHG emissions 
in 2050
[-] [year]
[GtCO2e] [GtCO2e] [GtCO2e]
Median Range** Median Range** Median Range**
Limit global temperature increase to below 2°C during the 21st century with: 
“Likely“ chance 
(>66%) 
39
2010-
2020
44 26-(41-47)-50 37 20-(33-44)-47 21 12-(18-25)-32
“Medium“ chance 
(50 to 66%) 
25
2010-
2020
46 40-(44-48)-52 41 36-(39-46)-53 27 20-(24-29)-36
 * Because most IAM pathways provide emissions data only for 5-year or 10-year increments, the encompassing period in which the peak in global 
emissions occurs is given. The peak year period given here reflects the 20th – 80th percentile range. With current emissions around 50 GtCO2e/yr, 
pathways with 2020 emissions below that value would in general imply that global emissions have peaked.
 ** Range is presented as the minimum value – (20th – 80th percentile) – maximum value
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are from Kitous et al. (2010); Magne et al. (2010); and from 
three other modelling groups in the Asian Modelling Exercise 
(Calvin et al., 2012). Although there are too few results to 
allow robust conclusions, the few available scenarios show 
that for a “medium” or lower chance of staying below the 
1.5°C target, emissions in 2020 should not exceed around 
43 GtCO2e/yr. This is consistent with the 2010 Emissions 
Gap Report (UNEP, 2010) which  concluded from “stylized”22 
emission trajectories that, to stay within the 1.5°C target, 
emissions in 2020 should not exceed 44 GtCO2e/yr (range 
of 39 to 44). Furthermore, emissions in 2050 are 15 GtCO2e/
yr or lower in our scenarios with a “medium” chance of 
complying with the 1.5°C target. Scenarios consistent with 
the 1.5°C target require very stringent emission reduction 
rates of 3 to 5% per year (Schaeffer and Hare, 2009; Ranger 
et al., 2010; UNEP, 2010) after emissions peak, and assume 
some temporary overshooting of the target temperature. 
Some evidence from the literature suggests that staying 
within the 1.5°C target will require reductions of not only 
long-lived greenhouse gases like CO2, but also shorter-lived 
gases such as methane (Shindell et al., 2012; Smith et al., 
2012). It is anticipated that forthcoming studies will allow 
more robust conclusions. 
3.6 Other findings from the least cost 
scenarios 
The set of scenarios used to compute the emissions 
gap also provides valuable information about the type 
of mitigation that would close the gap in 2020 and would 
contribute to staying within the 2oC target throughout the 
rest of the century. 
3.6.1 The role of a package of energy measures
The Global Energy Assessment (GEA) created a large set 
of energy transition scenarios23 (Riahi et al., 2012) that are 
consistent with the 2°C target. The GEA found that limiting 
energy demand, electrifying the transport sector, and 
significantly expanding carbon capture and storage (CCS) 
and renewable energy production were the most critical 
conditions for staying within the 2°C target. While the GEA 
shows that there are many feasible ways to make an energy 
system transition consistent with 2°C, it also shows that if 
energy demand is not drastically reduced through energy 
saving and efficiency measures, significantly fewer options 
remain available.
3.6.2 The importance of renewable energy
The Special Report on Renewable Energy Sources and 
Climate Change Mitigation from the IPCC (Fischedick et al., 
2011) provides the context for understanding the role of 
renewable energy (RE) in climate mitigation. It reviews 164 
medium- to long-term scenarios from 16 different IAMs, 
highlighting the importance of interactions and competition 
with other mitigation technologies, as well as the evolution 
of energy demand more generally.  The study showed that 
22 Stylized emission scenarios are scenarios that are designed to better 
understand the relationships between emissions and temperatures but do 
not explicitly incorporate assumptions about technological, economic or 
socio-political feasibility of emission reductions.
23 Available at: http://www.iiasa.ac.at/web-apps/ene/geadb/
a great effort to increase energy efficiency would lessen the 
need for other technological options including nuclear, CCS, 
and renewable energy. This is discussed further in Section 
3.6.4. 
3.6.3 Negative emissions and how they can be 
achieved 
“Net negative emissions” means that on a global basis 
more greenhouse gases are being intentionally removed 
from the atmosphere (e.g. by planting forests or through 
CCS) than are being emitted globally.
About 40% of the scenarios analysed earlier in this 
chapter with a “likely” chance of meeting the 2°C target will 
have net negative global greenhouse gas emissions before 
2100. About 30% with a “medium” chance have negative 
emissions. Moreover, about 50% of the scenarios analysed 
earlier with a “likely” chance of complying with the 2°C target 
have negative energy- and industry-related CO2 emissions by 
2100. For scenarios with a “medium” chance, the figure is 
60%, as higher short-term emissions in these scenarios have 
to be offset by steeper and deeper cuts afterwards. 
To achieve “net negative emissions” many studies assume 
a large deployment of the BioCCS technology - bioenergy 
combined with CCS. As explained in an earlier emissions 
gap report (UNEP, 2010), this involves using large amounts 
of biomass to generate energy (taking up CO2 from the 
atmosphere during its growth) and then capturing and 
storing underground or elsewhere the CO2 released by 
combustion.  In this way BioCCS in effect removes CO2 from 
the atmosphere (Azar et al., 2010).  
A number of scientific studies and assessments have 
demonstrated that the availability of BioCCS is a crucial 
determinant for the costs and achievability of low greenhouse 
gas concentration stabilization targets (Azar et al., 2010; 
Edenhofer et al., 2010; Tavoni and Tol, 2010; van Vuuren et 
al., 2010). For example, most scenarios surveyed in the IPCC 
Special Report on Renewable Energy Sources and Climate 
Change Mitigation and consistent with the 2°C target expect 
only limited BioCCS deployment by 2020 (0.1-0.4 GtCO2/yr), 
but see an important expansion of this option by 2050/2100 
(2.2-12.4 GtCO2/yr / 4.3-25.3 GtCO2/yr) (based on Fischedick 
et al., 2011).
Whether BioCCS is considered in a scenario has important 
implications for the timing of emission reductions. For 
instance, scenarios without BioCCS show significantly 
more stringent emission reductions over the short term, to 
compensate for the lower mitigation potential later (Figure 
3.3). As most new studies include BioCCS in their standard 
technology portfolio, the allowable 2020 emissions of new 
scenarios are typically higher than in older scenarios. One 
study (Van Vuuren and Riahi, 2011) showed that scenarios 
with BioCCS have CO2 emissions almost 10 GtCO2/yr higher 
in 2020 than scenarios without it. However, some least cost 
scenarios manage to stay below 2°C without a contribution 
from BioCCS (van Vuuren and Riahi, 2011; Riahi et al., 2012). 
No scenarios with 2020 emissions more than 20% higher 
than in 2000 (lower than any of the cases assessed in the 
previous chapter24, Figure 3.3) have been developed that 
24 Note that the increase in total greenhouse gas emissions is taken as a proxy 
for the increase in CO2 emissions from fossil fuel and industry. 
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achieve this (van Vuuren and Riahi, 2011; van Vliet et al., 
2012). This implies that scenarios with higher emissions in 
2020 increasingly rely on negative emission technologies, 
like BioCCS, to compensate for the lack of short-term 
reductions. In fact, any restriction on the potential of any 
other mitigation options would have a qualitatively similar 
effect on short-term emissions. In other words, the estimates 
for emissions in 2020 consistent with the 2°C target depend 
very strongly on the feasibility of long-term mitigation 
measures like BioCCS. 
The feasibility of large-scale BioCCS deployment for climate 
change mitigation crucially hinges on two factors. The first 
is the technical and social feasibility of large-scale CCS; for 
example, the development of a CCS infrastructure and the 
agreement of communities to accept CCS (Johnsson et al., 
2009; Brunsting et al., 2011). The second is the technical 
and social feasibility of sustainable large-scale bioenergy 
production; for example, the development of second 
generation bioenergy conversion technologies, such as for 
producing fuels from woody biomass, or policy frameworks 
that control direct and indirect land-use emissions caused 
by bioenergy production (Chum et al., 2011). Even if these 
conditions are met, large scale bioenergy deployment may 
have severe implications, for instance on food prices. Many 
IAMs do not yet fully represent relevant processes that may 
limit the availability of bioenergy (Creutzig et al., 2012).
The feasibility and consequences of large-scale bioenergy 
systems are also related to the availability of sufficient land 
and water, their impact on biodiversity, and the productivity 
of biomass. If negative CO2 emissions at a significant scale 
are not possible, then the options for meeting the global 
temperature targets will be significantly limited. 
Negative emissions can also be achieved through 
concerted afforestation efforts or direct air capture of CO2 
in combination with CCS. While direct air capture is typically 
not included in IAMs, most models include afforestation 
and/or BioCCS. 
3.6.4 The advantages of lower energy demand 
As noted above, the GEA assessment (Riahi et al., 2012) 
and the IPCC assessment (Fischedick et al., 2011) indicate 
the paramount importance of demand-side efficiency and 
conservation measures for future reductions of greenhouse 
gas emissions. The basic idea is that low energy demand 
provides more flexibility for the supply side of the energy 
system, allowing comparatively higher emissions around 
2020 (a low energy demand future implies reductions of 
demand in developed countries and a slower growth of 
demand in developing regions). A headline conclusion of the 
GEA scenario assessment is that a low level of global energy 
demand would make it possible to reach the 2°C and other 
sustainability targets without relying on nuclear energy and/
or CCS. By comparison, if energy demand is higher, both 
technologies will be needed to meet the 2°C target (see Figure 
17.13 in Riahi et al., 2012). Another important finding is that 
significant efficiency improvements would make possible an 
energy transition with limited reliance on bioenergy and with 
no reliance on carbon sink management or BioCCS.
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Figure 3.3. Comparison of 2020 emissions of pathways roughly consistent with staying below 2°C with and without BioCCS, and 
the pledge cases.
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An additional message from these studies is that the 
speed of the energy supply side transition need not be so 
rapid if there is a major push for efficiency (although they 
assume that energy-related emissions will peak by 2020 or 
soon after). Up to 2030, for example, the primary energy 
supply mix under low-demand scenarios meeting the 2°C 
target is only modestly different from today’s. However, 
if energy efficiency continues to improve at only current 
rates, then more radical changes in energy supply will 
be required over the next two decades, and there will be 
greater dependence on nuclear power, bioenergy, or other 
low-carbon technologies.
3.7 Results of later action scenarios 
The preceding sections have outlined results from least cost 
scenarios that assume immediate, coordinated mitigation 
actions. In this section, we discuss results from the later action 
scenarios. As noted earlier, these scenarios assume less short-
term mitigation (and therefore have higher emissions in the 
near term) and begin a least cost mitigation pathway towards 
a global climate target only at a point later than the base year. 
The short-term mitigation action in these scenarios would be 
compatible with 2°C only with much more stringent action 
later. Just  a few studies on later action scenarios have been 
published, for example, Clarke et al. (2009); OECD (2012); 
van Vliet et al. (2012); Rogelj et al. (in press), but more are 
forthcoming25, which is why this report only reviews briefly 
the first findings of such scenarios.
By exploring the extent to which such later action scenarios 
are feasible within the constraints specified in IAMs, these 
scenarios provide insights beyond “optimal solutions” and 
reveal trade-offs. At least five principal trade-offs of later 
action pathways have already been identified (Clarke et al., 
2009; den Elzen et al., 2010; van Vuuren and Riahi, 2011; 
Jakob et al., 2012; OECD, 2012; van Vliet et al., 2012; Rogelj 
et al., in press):
(i) increased short-term flexibility (short-term emissions 
are higher),
(ii) higher technological dependency (due to the need 
for a higher rate of future emission reductions), 
(iii) higher overall costs, 
(iv) pressure on future policy requirements and societal 
choices, and 
(v) increased climatic risks. 
Each of these is discussed in more detail below.
3.7.1 Increased short-term flexibility
A key characteristic of later action scenarios is that they 
show by definition a higher degree of short-term flexibility 
for emissions reductions than pathways that assume 
immediate action. In other words, they have higher near 
term emissions. The setup of these scenarios mimics 
situations in which some countries and economic sectors 
do not immediately participate in mitigation actions, or in 
which short-term emissions are consistent with the current 
25 Two major international modelling comparison projects, AMPERE (http://
ampere-project.eu/web/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&
id=2&Itemid=102) and LIMITS (http://www.feem-project.net/limits/), are 
presently under way to explore this question in more detail.
level of country pledges. They may also resemble a situation 
in which the short-term economic burden of mitigation 
action is reduced by assuming more action later.
3.7.2 Higher technological dependency
Later action scenarios aim to compensate for higher short-
term emissions with faster and deeper reductions later. 
Such reductions generally rely on optimistic assumptions 
about long-term and uncertain mitigation options. In these 
scenarios, not only is the availability of specific technologies 
very important, but also the pace at which such technologies 
can be scaled up. For example, recent studies (OECD, 2012; 
van Vliet et al., 2012) have found that emission levels in 
2020 resulting from an optimistic compliance with country 
pledges26 (which according to the least cost analysis in this 
report would cause an emissions gap) would have a “likely” 
chance of staying within the 2°C target if BioCCS was later 
used on a very large scale. The problem with becoming very 
dependent on future technologies is that if they do not realise 
the potential assumed in the scenarios, society will have 
fewer options to achieve the necessary emission reductions. 
This is a key point because some studies focusing on possible 
technology barriers and risks (e.g., Riahi et al., 2012) show that 
under unfavourable conditions, it might even be impossible to 
achieve the 2°C target from much lower 2020 emissions. 
3.7.3 Higher overall costs
Later action scenarios result in lower short-term costs 
but often in higher overall costs. These costs are not evenly 
distributed over time. For example, a pathway with no 
mitigation action by 2020 will see emissions rise during 
this decade while mitigation costs up to 2020 will be zero. 
However, after that, higher emission reduction rates will be 
required27.  As a result, pathways with high 2020 emissions 
will have markedly higher mitigation costs post-2020 in order 
to limit warming to below 2°C. For example, tentative results 
from a limited set of scenarios (van Vliet et al., 2012) indicate 
mitigation costs after 2020 that are 10-15% higher28 than in 
least cost scenarios when 2020 emissions are equivalent to 
that of Pledge Case 4 in Chapter 2 (which was shown earlier 
not to close the gap)29. Another study (Jakob et al., 2012), 
which used three energy-economy models to explore the 
consequences of no mitigation action until 2020, found 
similar cost penalties compared to the least cost scenarios. 
Finally, OECD also reports that a later action scenario would 
require substantial additional costs after 2020 compared to a 
reference least cost scenario (OECD, 2012). 
26 The optimistic interpretation of country pledges from Van Vliet and 
colleagues (2012) limits emissions in 2020 to 47 GtCO2e/yr, compared to a 
2010 level of 44 GtCO2e/yr in their model. 
27 To achieve a given reduction in the least cost way, a model will first 
implement the cheapest options. To further increase the reduction rate, only 
mitigation options that are equally or more expensive are available.
28 Van Vliet et al. (2012) provide cumulative discounted direct mitigation costs 
from 2010 to 2100. Therefore, no clear distinction can be made between 
mitigation costs before and after 2020. A 12-14% range of mitigation cost 
increases is provided for this metric. Because these costs are discounted 
and those before 2020 are negatively correlated with those that follow, the 
increase in post-2020 mitigation costs will be higher than the 12-14% range. 
29 2010 emissions in van Vliet et al. (2012) are about 44 GtCO2e/yr, more than 
10% lower than the most recent global estimates (see Chapter 2). In fact, in 
absolute numbers, even the emissions in their unconditional pledges, lenient 
rules case (Case 1) are lower than the latest assessment of conditional 
pledges, stringent rules (Case 4 in Chapter 2). 
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3.7.4 Pressure on future policy requirements and 
societal choices
As noted, later action scenarios have higher near-term 
flexibility than least cost scenarios, partly because they 
do not assume immediate global participation in climate 
mitigation. On the other hand, all later action scenarios 
meeting the 2°C target and having emission levels in 2020 
near to the most optimistic pledge cases in Chapter 2, assume 
full global participation in stringent climate mitigation from 
2020 onwards (OECD, 2012; van Vliet et al., 2012). In this 
sense, the flexibility of a later action scenario may only be 
temporary. 
In addition, later action scenarios reduce the choices 
societies are able to make about preferred mitigation 
technologies. While several least cost scenarios show that 
the 2°C target can be met without BioCCS (Azar et al., 2010; 
Riahi et al., 2012; van Vliet et al., 2012), no later action 
scenarios published up to now can meet the target without 
BioCCS. 
3.7.5 Increased climatic risks
Later action scenarios pose greater risks of climate impacts 
for three reasons. First, in the near term more greenhouse 
gases accumulate in the atmosphere and there is the risk 
that they will not be compensated for later. Second, the risk 
of overshooting climate targets is higher (den Elzen et al., 
2010; van Vliet et al., 2012; Rogelj et al., in press). Third, the 
rate of temperature increase is higher (OECD, 2012; van Vliet 
et al., 2012).
The first point raises the possibility that a key technology 
like BioCCS may not manage to realise its potential, or 
perhaps that future policymakers are unwilling to take on 
the higher costs of mitigation.  If this happens, cumulative 
emissions of greenhouse gases might very well be higher 
than expected, and the Earth system would therefore 
be committed to greater warming and the likelihood of 
achieving the temperature targets would then decrease (e.g. 
Meinshausen et al., 2009).  
The higher levels of near-term emissions in later action 
scenarios may also lead to a temporary overshoot of climate 
targets (Clarke et al., 2009; den Elzen et al., 2010; van Vliet et 
al., 2012; Rogelj et al., in press), or may make such an overshoot 
longer and more pronounced (particularly in the case of a 
1.5°C target). Overshooting these targets in principle implies 
a greater risk of large-scale and possibly irreversible changes 
in the climate system: the temperature targets are in part 
designed to avoid such changes. Although inertia in the Earth 
system can provide some resilience to rapid changes (e.g. Ridley 
et al., 2010; Good et al., 2011), the longer the temperature 
remains at higher levels, the greater the probability of rapid 
and significant climatic changes and impacts. 
Finally, the OECD Environmental Outlook to 2050 (OECD, 
2012) reports that a later action scenario that starts 
from 2020 emission levels consistent with a stringent 
interpretation of the country pledges would cause a 10% 
higher annual temperature increase in the coming decades 
than in the least cost case. The rate of temperature increase 
would therefore also be influenced by later mitigation action.
3.8 Present UNFCCC policy options to bridge 
the gap 
Chapter 2 showed that applying strict accounting rules 
for LULUCF, surplus AAUs, and double-counting of offsets 
(currently being discussed within the UNFCCC climate talks) 
can lead to significantly lower emissions in 2020. Strict rules 
have an even bigger effect on reducing the emissions gap 
when they are combined with higher ambition levels. 
3.9 The implications of current emissions 
levels and the emissions gap  
Summing up, the analysis of least cost scenarios shows 
that a gap exists between the pledges and robust paths 
towards limiting global warming to below 2°C. Emissions 
are still on the rise and the available cumulative emission 
budget consistent with 2°C is being used up fast. The median 
cumulative emission budget from 2000 to 2050 in the 
pathways which are consistent with 2°C with a likely (>66%) 
probability is around 1890 GtCO2e. Between 2000 and 2010, 
24% of this budget was used, and in the past three years 
at least 8% more was used, leaving only around two-thirds 
(about 1250 GtCO2e) for the years up to 2050.
Importantly, the 2011 UNEP Bridging the Emissions Gap 
Report (UNEP, 2011) showed that mitigation options that 
go beyond current pledges are available at low to moderate 
costs. They could close the gap and bring 2020 emissions in 
line with limiting global temperature increase to below 2°C, 
thereby leaving the possibility open of returning to below 
1.5°C by 2100. 
Later action scenarios may avoid near-term mitigation 
costs, but at the expense of stronger future reliance on 
specific technologies, less flexibility for future generations 
in their choice of mitigation measures, higher overall costs, 
and higher climate risks. If mitigation is limited to current 
pledges, then the world could be on a pathway to one of 
these later action scenarios.
Finally, the findings of Chapters 2 and 3 (especially Figure 
3.1) show that the range of 2020 emission levels implied by 
current pledges is most consistent with pathways limiting 
global temperature increase (with a “likely” (>66%) chance) 
to 3 to 5°C above pre-industrial levels during the 21st century.
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Chapter 4
Bridging the Emissions Gap
4.1 Introduction
The analyses in Chapters 2 and 3 of this report concluded 
that the emissions gap in 2020 will likely be between 8 
and 13 GtCO2e. The chapters also estimated the difference 
between BaU emissions in 2020 and the emissions level 
consistent with a “likely” chance of staying within the 2°C 
target to be 14 GtCO2e. This chapter explores the potential 
for bridging this gap using a sector policy approach. 
Firstly, the chapter provides a summary and update of the 
estimated emission reduction potential by sector from the 
Bridging the Emissions Gap Report (UNEP, 2011). Secondly, 
it examines a number of sector-specific policies that have 
already been adopted by national or local governments in 
several countries and regions around the world, and that 
have been successful in reducing greenhouse gas emissions. 
Without pretence of being comprehensive in either the 
choice of sectors or policy instruments, the focus of the 
second part of the chapter is on best practices in three sectors: 
buildings, transport and forests. Together, the emission 
reduction potential of these three sectors makes up roughly 
40% of the total emission reduction potential estimated in the 
Bridging the Emissions Gap Report (UNEP, 2011).  
Besides the relative importance of these sectors in terms 
of their contribution to greenhouse gas emissions, they also 
offer examples of how ambitious policy instruments that lead 
to significant emission reductions can foster innovation and 
economic growth, bolster national energy security, improve 
public health and address other key developmental priorities. 
A key objective of the review of best practice policies is to 
demonstrate how they can be scaled up (both in ambition and 
geographical reach) in different countries and regions with 
due consideration to national differences and circumstances. 
Therefore, the chapter focuses not only on efficiency and 
equity issues, but also on political and economic factors that 
are the basis for successful policy design, implementation 
and enforcement. Regulatory issues of governance and legal 
and institutional settings are also discussed. Other policy 
instruments which could help achieve emission reductions 
in the power, industry, agriculture and waste sectors will be 
analysed in subsequent UNEP Emissions Gap Reports. 
4.2 Emission reduction potentials by sector in 
2020 – summary and update
4.2.1 Greenhouse gas emission reduction 
potentials based on sector studies
One approach to estimating the total emission reduction 
potential is to review detailed studies of the reduction 
potential by sector up to a certain marginal cost level. 
Adding up the sector estimates gives an indication of the 
total potential. Adopting this approach, the Bridging the 
Emissions Gap Report (UNEP, 2011) estimated the total 
emission reduction potential in 2020, at a marginal cost 
of about 50 – 100 US$/tCO2e to be in the range of 17 ± 3 
GtCO2e. A summary of the findings is provided in Table 4.1. 
As can be seen in the table, the uncertainty in the estimated 
emissions reduction potential for each sector is high. Hence, 
the value of the estimated emission reduction potential 
ranges from 10 to 23 GtCO2e. However, if it is assumed that 
not all uncertainties are at their high end at the same time, 
Lead Authors: Laura Segafredo (ClimateWorks Foundation, USA); Ronaldo Seroa da Motta (State University of Rio de Janeiro and Instituto 
de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada, Brazil).
Contributing Authors: Arild Angelsen (Centre for International Forestry Research, Indonesia and Norwegian University of Life Science, 
Norway); Kornelis Blok (Ecofys, Germany); Ramon Cruz (Institute for Transportation and Development Policy, USA); Holger Dalkmann 
(EMBARQ/World Resources Institute, USA); Christine Egan (Collaborative Labelling and Appliance Standards Project, Belgium); Cristiano 
Façanha (International Council on Clean Transportation, USA); Peter Graham (Global Building Performance Network, France); Jorge Hargrave 
(Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada, Brazil); Debbie Karpay (Collaborative Labelling and Appliance Standards Project, Belgium); 
Julien Pestiaux (Climact, Belgium); My Ton (Collaborative Labelling and Appliance Standards Project, Belgium); Diana Ürge-Vorsatz (Central 
European University, Hungary); Sven Wunder (Centre for International Forestry Research, Brazil). 
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then a more reasonable estimate of the emissions reduction 
potential would be 17 ± 3 GtCO2e30.
The mid-range of 17 GtCO2e confirms that the total 
emission reduction potential is sufficient to close the 
emissions gap between projected emissions based on 
country pledges and the emissions level consistent with a 
“likely” chance of staying below the 2°C target. The value 
also exceeds the estimated difference between projected 
BaU emissions in 2020 and the emissions level consistent 
with a “likely” chance of staying below the 2°C target (that is 
14 GtCO2e), noting that the low range of emissions reduction 
potential just equals this difference. 
4.2.2 An update on sectoral emission reduction 
potentials
Since the release of the Bridging the Emissions Gap Report 
(UNEP, 2011), a number of studies have been published that 
provide new scenarios of relevance to bottom-up, sectoral 
assessments of energy-related greenhouse gas emission 
reductions. The studies include the three scenarios of the 
Global Energy Assessment (Johansson et al., 2012); an update 
of the Energy Technology Perspectives of the International 
Energy Agency (IEA, 2012); an update of the Energy Revolution 
scenarios prepared for Greenpeace, Global Wind Energy 
Council (GWEC) and European Renewable Energy Council 
(EREC) (Teske, 2012); a scenario based analysis prepared by 
the Global Buildings Performance Network and the Central 
European University (Ürge-Vorsatz et al., 2012b); and the 
Global Transportation Energy and Climate Roadmap, updating 
the Roadmap model (ICCT, in press). All of these studies have 
a long-term focus, leading up to 2050, and provide snapshots 
of mitigation opportunities in different scenarios. 
As a first conclusion, the findings of these studies are 
consistent with the range of emission reduction potentials 
30 It is unlikely that all or several sectors will be simultaneously at the high 
ends of their uncertainty range. Therefore, assuming that the uncertainties 
are independent between sectors (which may hold under many cases) we 
can apply an error propagation rule to calculate the range of the sum of the 
sectors (the square root of the sum of the squares of the range for each 
sector). This gives a reduced range of ±3 Gt CO2e compared to the full range 
of ±7 Gt CO2e.
Sector Emission reduction potential in 2020 (GtCO2e)
Power sector 2.2 – 3.9
Industry 1.5 – 4.6
Transport* 1.7 – 2.5
Buildings 1.4 – 2.9
Forestry 1.3 – 4.2
Agriculture 1.1 – 4.3
Waste around 0.8
Total (Full range) 10 – 23
Total 17 ± 3  (Assuming not all uncertainties at their high end 
simultaneously**)
Source: UNEP Bridging the Emissions Gap Report (UNEP, 2011)
 * including shipping and aviation
 ** see footnote 30
Table 4.1 Sectoral greenhouse gas emission reduction potentials in 2020 compared to BaU, at marginal costs below 50 to 100 US$/tCO2e, 
either explicitly or implicitly
reported in the Bridging the Emissions Gap Report (UNEP, 
2011) and summarised in Table 4.1.
The Global Transportation Energy and Climate Roadmap 
(ICCT, in press) estimates the emission reduction potential 
for the transport sector, including aviation and marine, in 
2020 to be around 2 GtCO2e. For buildings, the scenario 
analysis of best practice policies for low energy and carbon 
buildings (Ürge-Vorsatz et al., 2012) confirms the significant 
emission reduction potential of the building sector. For 
2020, the study estimates an emission reduction potential 
of approximately 2.1 GtCO2e globally. Both estimates are 
well within the uncertainty ranges of the emission reduction 
potential of the transport and building sectors reported 
here.
Focusing on “current developments” rather than scenarios, 
the latest Energy Technology Perspectives report (IEA, 2012) 
highlights good progress over the past year for renewable 
power generation; moderate progress for industrial energy 
efficiency, vehicle fuel economy and the transition to electric 
vehicles; and disappointing results for power plant efficiency, 
nuclear power, carbon capture and storage, buildings and 
transportation biofuels. These developments may have an 
impact on the potential that can be realized in 2020. 
A very positive development in recent years is the 
significant reduction in the cost of photovoltaic (PV) power 
generation. At the start of 2012, prices of photovoltaic 
modules were down 50% compared to a year earlier, and 
76% below the level in the summer of 2008 (McCrone et al., 
2012). Levelized Energy Costs31 of generating electricity from 
photovoltaic systems are now in the range of 100 – 260 US$/
MWh (McCrone et al., 2012). These developments have led 
some authors to adjust their 2020 estimates for installed 
solar PV capacity upwards (Krewit et al., 2010; Breyer, 2011; 
Teske, 2012). An increase of the installed photovoltaic solar 
capacity by as much as 500 GW will lead to an increase in 
31 Levelized Energy Cost (LEC) refers to the price at which electricity must be 
generated from a specific source to break even over the project lifetime. It 
takes into consideration all the costs associated with an energy generating 
system over its lifetime including initial investment, operations and 
maintenance, cost of fuel, and cost of capital. 
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avoided emissions of 0.4 GtCO2e. Although this is a very 
substantial potential contribution by one single technology, 
it falls within the uncertainty range for the total emission 
reduction potential indicated in Table 4.1. Together with the 
generally positive trend in renewable power generation, it 
is becoming more likely that the higher end of the potential 
estimated in UNEP (2011) would be achieved for this 
category. 
4.2.3 The emission reduction potential is still 
significant, but time is running out
In summary, the review of recently published studies 
generally confirms the emission reduction potentials for 
2020, as estimated in the Bridging the Emissions Gap Report 
(UNEP, 2011) and shown in Table 4.1. However, the mixed 
progress reported from different sectors (as highlighted 
in the latest Energy Technology Perspectives report (IEA, 
2012); see Section 4.2.2 above) gives rise to concerns about 
the estimated emission reduction potential in 2020. This is 
particularly so because an important caveat to estimates of 
emission reduction potential is that they can only be realized 
if strong, long-term and sector-specific policies are in place at 
the global and national levels (UNEP, 2011).
Even if the potential remains the same, there is basically 
one year less to achieve this reduction, implying steeper and 
more costly actions will be required to potentially bridge 
the emissions gap by 2020. At the same time, any new 
investments in buildings, transportation systems, factories, 
and other infrastructure would fix energy use patterns for 
decades. Therefore, lack of action now will lead to a “lock 
in” of high energy use and emissions for a long period of 
time. Without ambitious policies, these investments may 
also lead to other consequences, including harmful pollution 
and increased energy demand which could result in higher 
energy prices. However, the rapid implementation of sound 
policies can steer those investments towards low-carbon 
technologies and sustainable growth. 
4.3 Best practice policies 
This section illustrates how a number of sector-specific 
policies that have already been successfully implemented 
in several countries and regions around the world have the 
potential, if scaled up both in ambition and geographical 
reach, to contribute to bridging the emissions gap.
4.3.1 Best practice policies in the building sector: 
building codes
Introduction
Building codes are regulatory instruments that set 
standards for specific technologies or energy performance 
levels and can be applied to both new buildings or to retrofits 
of existing buildings. The building sector contributes around 
8% of global greenhouse gas emissions and approximately 
one third of all energy-related greenhouse gas emissions. In 
addition to the reduction potential for 2020 listed in Table 
4.1, the sector has been recognized as having the largest 
longer-term, cost-effective greenhouse gas mitigation 
potential of any industrial sector (IPCC, 2007; Ürge-Vorsatz 
et al., 2012b).
While there is extensive greenhouse gas mitigation 
potential in the building sector, buildings are long-lived. A 
combination of slow turnover and retrofit rates implies that 
the shorter term potential is significantly below the longer 
term potential. A recent scenario-based study (Ürge-Vorsatz 
et al., 2012b) estimates the global emission reduction 
potential to be approximately 2.1 GtCO2e by 2020, but up to 9 
GtCO2e by 205032. To illustrate, this implies that by 2050, the 
building sector could consume 30% less energy compared 
to 2005, despite a close to 130% projected increase in built 
floor area over the same period. Figure 4.1 illustrates these 
scenarios. 
“Lock-in” and urgency of action
The long-lived nature of buildings also implies that there 
is a risk of “locking in” energy inefficiencies resulting in 
emissions that are substantially higher than necessary. 
For instance, if policy development and reform continues 
at current rates (illustrated by the “moderate” scenario in 
Figure 4.1), it is estimated that emission reductions will be 
1.6 GtCO2e in 2020 and 4.5 GtCO2e in 2050, in contrast to 
the 2.1 GtCO2e in 2020 and 9 GtCO2e in 2050 estimated to be 
technically and economically feasible. 
The strength and appropriateness of building sector 
policies in place over the next few years will therefore 
determine total building emissions for several decades 
to come – pointing to the advantages of quick action. If 
the building sector is to reduce emissions sufficiently to 
contribute to achieving the 2°C target, policy packages 
containing state of the art building codes may need to 
become mandatory over the next 10 years in all the major 
economies such as the USA, India, China and the European 
Union (Ürge-Vorsatz et al., 2012b). 
Policies that work
Building codes are an example of visible success in the 
field of climate-related policy-making. Few other areas exist 
where policies have been put in place over the last decade 
to achieve significant emission reductions, while providing 
the same or even increased service levels. Leading European 
countries have used the last 20 to 30 years to develop and 
increase the stringency of building energy policies. However, 
China has taken only a decade to develop and implement 
its first generation codes and under the 12th five year plan 
is rapidly increasing the stringency of codes and mandating 
the application of energy efficiency standards to renovation 
projects. In the USA, two sets of codes are in place, but there 
is potential for further action (see Box 4.1).
Building codes that set minimum energy performance 
requirements have proven to be among the most effective 
policy tools for cost-effective energy savings and greenhouse 
gas reductions (UNEP, 2008). To be most effective, they 
should be implemented as a core element of integrated 
packages of regulatory standards, financial incentives, and 
voluntary programmes (Ürge-Vorsatz and Koeppel, 2007). 
In practice, building codes have proven more efficient than
32 These figures refer to all buildings, including residential, public and 
commercial, and cover heating, cooling and hot water energy use.
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market-based instruments34 in the residential and 
commercial sectors, due to market imperfections such 
as owner-tenant and builder-occupant split incentives; 
34 Market-based instruments harness market forces (e.g., prices, taxes, levies, 
subsidies and other economic variables) to encourage the adoption of good 
practices.
inadequate information and associated high transaction 
costs; risk aversion towards higher first-costs; first-cost 
psychology barriers; and other factors.
In general, effective policies for reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions from the building sector set targets for absolute 
energy performance for new buildings and occasionally for 
Figure 4.1 Three scenarios of total world thermal energy use in buildings. Source: Ürge-Vorsatz, D., et al. (2012)33
33 The scenarios are based on the following assumptions:  
(a) ‘frozen’ scenario: A baseline scenario, where energy performance of new and retrofit buildings does not improve as compared to their 2005 levels,  
(b) ‘medium’ scenario: Assuming that the current rate of policy development and reform continues,  
(c) ‘deep’ scenario: State-of-the-art policies adopted as integrated packages.
EU: Reducing the energy required for heating has been a major focus of building energy policies in the European 
Union, where the existing building stock is large and rates of replacement are relatively low, and where a majority of 
the population live in cool to moderate climate zones. The EU Energy Performance in Buildings Directive is the key 
policy framework for driving low energy consumption in new and existing buildings. Introduced in 2002, it creates an 
integrated basis for the implementation of performance-based, rather than prescriptive building codes and supporting 
policy strategies. It sets common targets for absolute reductions in energy consumption across the EU member states. 
In 2010 the Directive was recast with more stringent energy reduction targets, including the requirement for member 
states to implement “Near Zero Energy” building codes. However, it still faces challenges in implementation and 
compliance, since there are significant variations among member states (Levine et al, 2012).
USA: Buildings in the USA have the highest energy consumption relative to population compared to other places 
where codes have evolved over the last decades. The International Energy Conservation Code and the codes of the 
American Society of Heating, Refrigerating and Air-conditioning Engineers, as well as other variants of these codes, are 
applied to all major new building types in the USA with varied stringency by different states, creating a patchwork of 
effectiveness in the code environment. California, the Pacific Northwest, and some Northeast states lead in terms of 
rapid implementation of national model codes. However, there is a potential to move to more performance-based codes 
in order to facilitate absolute energy reduction targets, such as “Net Zero Energy” buildings (Levine et al, 2012).
China: As in most emerging countries, new buildings are the priority for emissions reduction in China. China adds 
about 1.7 billion square meters of new building floor area annually (Bin and Li, 2012) and buildings in China currently 
account for nearly 20% of total annual primary energy consumption and greenhouse gas emissions. Over the past 
twenty years China has made great efforts to reduce heat loss in and improve efficiency of space heating in the northern 
regions, in particular in residential buildings. Three design standards now cover four out of the five climate zones of the 
country (Levine et al., 2012). China has also recently introduced building energy performance codes for new public and 
commercial buildings in all climate zones.
Box 4.1 Building codes in the EU, USA and China
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retrofits35. Absolute targets provide a more certain policy 
environment for market transformation that can help drive 
demand for more energy efficient buildings (Economist 
Intelligence Unit, 2012). Policy targets for mandatory energy 
efficient renovation of existing buildings are under way 
within the European Union and in different parts of China 
and the USA. Although state-of-the-art, these targets have 
yet to become widely implemented in building codes, which 
implies that even in the most progressive jurisdictions, there 
is significant potential for scaling up mandatory energy 
efficient renovation to further reduce emissions (Ürge-
Vorsatz et al., 2012b). 
With regard to cost-effectiveness, very few studies exist 
that rigorously evaluate cost-effectiveness on a comparable 
basis. Available estimates however, show attractive ranges. 
For example, one study estimates that emission reductions 
from buildings in the EU region could have an average cost 
of less than 36.5 US$/tCO2e with a cost range spanning –109 
to 49 US$/tCO2e (Kiss et. al., in preparation). Generally, 
the overall cost-efficiency that can be achieved will be 
dependent on the design of the building code and how the 
code is implemented. 
Drivers and co-benefits
Building regulations are often not motivated by 
environmental or energy reasons.  Instead, they are advanced 
to promote safety, save costs, or for other socioeconomic 
reasons. In addition, well-designed and implemented 
building codes are associated with major co-benefits (see, 
Tirado et al., 2011). First of all, the general co-benefits 
related to improved energy efficiency all prevail, including 
improved energy security and social welfare, improved 
outdoor air quality and related health and productivity, and 
competitiveness gains. 
Very high performance buildings also result in significant 
gains in values of the building infrastructure and ability to 
rent out properties. 
Large retrofit programmes have been assessed to have 
important net employment benefits, even when employment 
losses in the energy supply sector are considered. A study 
of a broadly implemented ambitious retrofit programme in 
Hungary reported a significant net employment gain (Ürge-
Vorsatz et al., 2010). The employment created by ambitious 
retrofit programmes is mostly localized and not exportable 
because it requires on-site labour, thus contributing to 
regional and local development goals.
Lessons and scope for scaling up
While there have been major successes in policies that 
reduce energy use of buildings around the world, often these 
measures merely constitute the tip of the iceberg. Scaling up 
efforts in terms of ambition in energy performance levels, 
building types covered (new and retrofit), and geographic 
regions, presents an exceptional opportunity for emission 
reductions from the building sector that could dwarf any 
reductions already accomplished or planned up to now.  
35 Existing buildings are more challenging to address through building codes 
because codes in this case would only be applied when the building is 
renovated, and that is not very often. Therefore, most policies have focused 
on new construction where it is enough to have more stringent performance 
levels prescribed to components or for the building as a whole.
Compared to code frameworks in the USA, China and 
India, the EU’s Energy Performance in Buildings Directive 
has had greater success in achieving deep reductions in 
thermal energy required by buildings (Urge-Vorsatz et al., 
2012b). It is therefore tempting to suggest that all regions 
should follow the EU’s lead. However, effective development 
and implementation of building codes is very site specific 
and depends on cultural practices. For example, market-
based mechanisms are important for steering building 
improvements where a more liberal ideology is prevailing, 
as exemplified by building regulations in the USA. However, 
in Europe there is greater acceptance of government-led 
programmes supported by voluntary measures (Levine et 
al., 2012). In China there is a greater acceptance of central 
government implementation and enforcement of building 
codes (Bin and Li, 2012), while in India there appears to 
be a tension between state level implementation and a 
propensity for self-organization at the local level (Kochar, 
2010). 
Another lesson for scaling up and for the time frame 
in which emission reductions can be achieved relates to 
codes for new buildings. In many developed countries, 
new building codes aimed at very ambitious performance 
levels (such as net zero energy), will have limited impact 
on emission reductions in the next few decades, since new 
construction is limited36. In developed countries, therefore, 
building codes related to retrofits can make the largest 
difference in heating and cooling related emissions during 
the next decades. By contrast, in fast growing and urbanizing 
developing countries, regulating new construction brings the 
largest short term emission reduction gains. Building codes 
for new urban buildings can attain large emission reductions, 
since 85% of the growth in building energy use up to 2050 
will occur in urban areas, 70% of which will be in developing 
countries (Ürge-Vorsatz et al., 2012a).  
This points to an important role of cities as engines for 
introducing ambitious building codes. Codes introduced at 
the city level can capture the lion’s share of building-related 
heating and cooling mitigation potential. Cities are also 
very appropriate units for passing building code regulations 
because regulations work best when tailored to local climatic 
and cultural conditions. Besides, cities can often be more 
proactive and flexible in policy experiments than national 
governments. This is demonstrated by the proliferation of 
building-related performance mandates that cities have 
been adopting worldwide during the past decade primarily 
for climate reasons.
Enforcement is crucial for the effectiveness of building 
codes. Unfortunately the track record of building codes so 
far shows weak enforcement. It will be crucial to improve 
enforcement in order for building codes to become a key 
global mitigation strategy.  
In conclusion, design and implementation of codes should 
be guided by cultural and governance characteristics, in 
addition to population density, variation of climatic zones 
and the age and typologies of buildings. Often, building 
36 The percentage of new construction also varies among developed countries. 
For instance, in Europe building lifetimes and retrofit cycles are long; whereas 
the USA experiences larger new construction rates due to population growth, 
shorter building lifetimes and retrofit cycles.
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codes will be associated with co-benefits and in many cases 
it may be these benefits that drive building code policies, as 
they may be high priorities of local and national decision-
makers. It is clear that there is significant untapped potential 
to reduce emissions through building codes. This is the case 
globally, regionally, nationally and locally. The ambition of 
policies within the next few years will not only determine 
the emissions reduction potential that can be realised in the 
building sector in 2020, but will also have major implications 
in the decades to follow. 
4.3.2 Best practice policies in the building sector: 
appliance standards and labels 
Introduction
Energy performance standards and labels for appliances, 
equipment, and lighting are instruments that offer a large 
opportunity to improve energy efficiency. Moreover, they 
lead to substantial reductions in greenhouse gas emissions 
from households. Households are known to account for a 
significant percentage of total greenhouse gas emissions 
in different countries (e.g., Saidur et al., 2007; Milito and 
Gagnon, 2008; Kenny and Gray, 2009; Kerkhof et al., 2009; 
Gough et al., 2011). At last count, over 75 countries with more 
than 80% of the world’s population had energy efficiency 
standards or labelling policies in place (Egan, 2011). If best 
practice policies are adopted worldwide, standards and 
labels could result in emission reductions of approximately 
0.7 GtCO2e in 2020.37
Energy-efficiency standards are regulations that prescribe 
the energy performance of manufactured products, 
sometimes prohibiting the sale of products that are below a 
minimum level of efficiency. There are three types of energy-
efficiency standards: 
37 CO2 savings estimates are from the Bottom-up Energy Analysis System 
(BUENAS), a model developed by Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory 
(LBNL) and CLASP, and scaled up to a global estimate from the 62% of global 
final energy demand currently included in the model. 
• Prescriptive standards require that a particular feature 
or device be installed in all new products.
• Performance standards specify minimum efficiencies 
or maximum energy consumption levels that 
manufacturers must achieve in products. They specify 
the energy performance but not the technology or 
design details of the product.
• Class-average standards specify the average efficiency 
of a class of manufactured products, allowing each 
manufacturer to select the efficiency level for each 
model, such that the overall average is achieved.
Energy-efficiency labels are affixed to manufactured 
products to describe the product’s energy performance, 
usually in the form of energy use, efficiency, or energy 
cost. The labels provide consumers with the necessary 
information to make informed purchases. There are two 
basic types of labels:
• Endorsement labels are essentially “seals of approval” 
given according to specified criteria.
• Comparative labels allow consumers to compare 
performance among similar products using either 
discrete categories of performance or a continuous scale.
Standards and labelling programmes have the potential 
to significantly affect energy consumption in the residential, 
commercial, and industrial sectors in the next several 
decades, since much of the equipment that will use energy 
in the buildings sector in 2020 has yet to be installed. 
Developing robust standards and labelling programmes now 
can avoid “lock-in” of inefficient equipment and lead to the 
realization of significant emission reductions.  To illustrate, 
it is estimated that the minimum energy performance 
standards implemented from January 2010 through April 
2011 by member governments of the Super-efficient 
Credit: Franck Boston/Shutterstock.com
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Equipment and Appliance Deployment (SEAD) Initiative38 will 
yield savings of approximately 125 MtCO2 in 202039, which 
is as much energy as produced by roughly seventy five  500 
MW coal-fired power plants.
Appliance standards and labelling moves fairly quickly 
compared to other emissions reduction policies. However, 
there can be significant time lags between the time a 
government decides to regulate an appliance and actual 
emission reductions. In the USA for example, the supporting 
analyses required by law may take approximately two years. 
Once a new regulation is passed, it will often have a waiting 
period of about three years before implementation. Once 
implemented, emission reductions will accrue over the 
lifetime of the appliance, which may be up to 10-15 years.
Because labels do not eliminate products from the market, 
they have a lower regulatory burden and require less 
complicated analysis than standards. Therefore, labels can 
generally be implemented more quickly than standards, but 
it is evident that labelling without standards is less effective 
as a mitigation policy.
Policies that work
Standards and labelling policies are appropriate in most 
cultures and markets and are increasingly seen as a main tool 
for governments to address rising energy consumption and 
emissions in the appliance sector. Employing a combination 
of standards and labels allows for a larger impact on energy 
efficiency throughout the energy performance spectrum in 
each product class. One determining factor for the selection 
of the most effective standards and labelling combination 
is the product’s current energy efficiency in the market. 
Other conditions that affect policy choices may include the 
maturity of the programme, the presence or absence of 
domestic manufacturing, the level of consumer awareness, 
and the cost of electricity.
Governments around the world have made extensive 
use of minimum energy performance standards and 
labelling programmes to improve the energy efficiency 
of appliances and equipment, and thereby reducing 
appliance sector emissions. A recent example of minimum 
energy performance standards is Australia’s phase-out of 
incandescent lamps over the period from 2007 to 2010, 
estimated to cut Australia’s greenhouse gas emissions by 
approximately 0.14% (Department of Environment, Water, 
Heritage and the Arts, 2009). This phase-out approach using 
minimum energy performance standards is the model being 
promoted by UNEP’s en.lighten initiative40, a public-private 
partnership led by UNEP, the Global Environment Facility 
(GEF) and lighting industry partners aimed at phasing-out 
inefficient lamps in developing countries. 
38 SEAD is an initiative of the Clean Energy Ministerial. Member governments 
include: Australia, Brazil, Canada, the European Commission, France, Germany, 
India, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Russia, South Africa, Sweden, the United Arab 
Emirates, the United Kingdom, and the USA. These economies are responsible 
for about one half of global energy demand.
39 Energy and CO2 savings estimates are from the Bottom-up Energy Analysis 
System (BUENAS), a model developed by Lawrence Berkeley National 
Laboratory (LBNL) and CLASP. These estimates include the following SEAD 
member governments: Australia, Canada, EU, Korea, Mexico, and USA. These 
estimates do not include the following SEAD member governments: Brazil, 
India, Japan, Russia, South Africa, the United Arab Emirates, and EU members 
France, Germany, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
40 For further details, see http://www.enlighten-initiative.org/portal/Home/
tabid/56373/Default.aspx
Variations of the minimum energy performance standards 
approach include Japan’s Top Runner Programme41 and the 
European Union’s Ecodesign Directive42. The Top Runner 
approach identifies the most energy efficient product on the 
market in a product category, and uses that efficiency as the 
class average standard (Top Runner Standard) for all products 
at the next standard setting period, usually the next 3-7 
years. The EU’s Ecodesign scheme establishes a framework 
for setting requirements for relevant environmental 
characteristics of energy related products. The level of 
energy efficiency or consumption is set to minimize the life-
cycle energy cost to end-users, while also taking into account 
other environmental impacts. The Top Runner and Ecodesign 
Directive approaches have led to residential energy savings 
of 11% in Japan and 16% in the EU (Siderius and Nakagami, 
2012). 
For labelling programmes, the USA’s ENERGY STAR 
voluntary endorsement label has been successful in 
increasing market availability and consumer awareness 
of efficient products, and is also used as a model by other 
countries. As one of the first successful consumer-oriented 
labelling programmes, ENERGY STAR gained critical support 
from manufacturers in its early days, and then increased the 
stringency of the programme once it became an important 
and well-known label to consumers.
Standards and labelling have been successful in developing 
countries as well. For example, Ghana initiated a standards 
and labelling programme in 2005 with a minimum energy 
performance standard for room air conditioners, which is 
expected to save consumers and businesses an average of 
US$64 million annually in energy bills and reduce emissions 
by about 2.8 MtCO2e over 30 years43.
Drivers and co-benefits
One of the factors that encourage the development of 
energy efficiency policies is that, from a societal perspective, 
improving energy efficiency is generally more economically 
efficient than increasing energy supply. 
Similar to the co-benefits of building codes, energy-
efficiency standards and labelling policies reduce electricity 
use, which reduces fuel combustion in electric power plants 
and the associated impacts from extracting, transporting, 
and burning such fuels. Such cost-effective reduction 
in overall fuel combustion not only improves a nation’s 
economic efficiency, but it also benefits nations by lowering 
consumers’ energy bills, making energy services more 
affordable and improving public and environmental health. 
In the USA alone, additional efficiency improvements in 14 
key product classes could result in US$300 billion cumulative 
savings to consumers by 2030 (McNeil et al., 2011).
Lessons and scope for scaling up
The success of minimum energy performance standards 
and product labelling depends on selecting and designing 
41 For further details, see http://www.eccj.or.jp/top_runner/index.html and 
http://www.climatepolicy.jp/thesis/pdf/09035dp.pdf
42 For further details, see http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/sustainable-
business/documents/eco-design/legislation/framework-directive/index_
en.htm
43 Energy and CO2 savings numbers from the Policy Analysis Modelling System 
(PAMS), a model developed by Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL) 
and CLASP.
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rules and regulations that meet the specific needs of a 
country and its particular objectives. Additional market-
based incentives or informational policy options generally 
support standards and labelling but do not displace standards 
and labelling in cost-effectiveness. It is also clear that a 
combination of standards and labelling is more effective 
than either instrument alone, and mandatory schemes are 
generally more effective than voluntary ones. Experience 
shows that successful standards and labelling policies are 
usually preceded by rigorous cost-benefit analyses to ensure 
that they generate economic benefits even in the absence of 
a carbon price.
Comparability among regulations and test methods 
for a product is critical for encouraging more stringent 
policies, as it helps countries understand what efficiency 
levels are possible based on what other programmes have 
accomplished. Other factors important to the success of 
standards and labelling programmes and to their scaling up 
include (Weil and McMahon, 2005):
• Availability of trained, competent personnel;
• Availability of institutions capable of implementing 
change in the sector; 
• Existence of the political will to support implementing 
agencies in fulfilling their mandate;
• Existence of product testing capabilities or the ability to 
establish them;
• Availability or ability to establish the necessary 
measurement, verification and enforcement 
infrastructures; and
• Consultations with all stakeholders involved in the 
manufacture and sale of targeted products to ensure 
acceptance and encourage manufacturers to adopt the 
standards. 
Finally, policies should be reviewed and revised regularly, 
possibly every 3-5 years, to increase stringency and drive 
continued energy savings. For standards, the development 
of improved and cost-effective energy saving technologies 
should be encouraged, so as to enable more stringent 
standards. For labels, especially non-categorical ones, once 
the market becomes too saturated with highly efficient 
products, it becomes more difficult for consumers to 
differentiate among the most efficient products. Hence, it 
is important to regularly increase the stringency of labels in 
order for them to remain meaningful to consumers.
Establishing appropriate institutions and processes takes 
time. The same applies for conducting techno-economic 
analyses to identify priority products and establish 
savings potentials, and the testing of methodologies and 
establishment of verification procedures. In the case 
of product labelling, additional time and investment in 
communications and outreach will be required to build up 
awareness and trust.
4.3.3 Best practice policies in the transport sector
Introduction
The rapid motorisation characterising 20th Century 
development, while resulting in economic growth and 
improved quality of life, has produced many adverse 
consequences such as traffic congestion, air pollution, 
unsafe roads and social inequalities. At the same time, the 
transport sector has the highest projected growth rate of 
greenhouse gas emissions and currently accounts for 13% 
of global greenhouse gas emissions. As noted in section 4.2, 
the sector also has significant potential for cutting emissions, 
estimated at 1.7-2.5 GtCO2e in 2020, including aviation and 
marine sources (ICCT, in press). In the past, transportation 
development focused on improvements for higher-emitting 
private vehicles. At present there is a move towards more 
sustainable transport, as indicated by the eight biggest 
multilateral development banks pledging US$175 billion for 
sustainable transport over the next decade at the Rio+20 UN 
Conference on Sustainable Development in June 2012. 
Sustainable transport represents a shift in the way 
transport infrastructure is approached, focusing on moving 
people rather than vehicles through mass transit, walking 
and cycling, and inland waterways. Along with this shift, 
a framework focusing on “Avoid”, “Shift” and “Improve” 
policies and measures (see below) is increasingly being 
adopted. A variety of successful policies within these three 
categories have been in place for decades in countries 
around the world (Pucher and Buehler, 2010). 
Avoid policies – aim and examples 
These policies have an overall aim of avoiding or reducing 
trips, thereby reducing the generation of vehicle-kilometres44 
and subsequently greenhouse gas emissions. 
A key focus is to promote comprehensive planning of 
new communities, or the redevelopment of economically 
depressed or polluted areas, focusing on mixed-uses with 
access to mass transit. Integration of land-use policies, 
transport planning and the development of new urban areas 
around transit corridors is an example of a comprehensive 
“avoid” policy package. This can be a central policy option in 
emerging economies to prevent growth in the use of private 
vehicles and associated increases in future emissions from 
the transport sector. Transit-oriented development is one 
example of such an “avoid” policy, discussed later in this 
section. 
Avoid policies often use a range of instruments that in 
addition to planning may comprise economic, regulatory 
and information instruments (Sakamoto et al., 2010). 
Examples of such instruments include elimination or 
reduction of fossil fuel subsidies; and pricing mechanisms 
designed to change behaviour and incentivize people 
not to use individual vehicles. Other examples are fiscal 
mechanisms such as emissions-based road use charges for 
freight vehicles to encourage improved loading and routing 
and a reduction of empty movements; and, encouraging the 
use of telecommunication to reduce travel.
“Shift” policies – aim and examples
These policies promote shifts to the lowest greenhouse gas 
emitting modes of transportation and discourage shifts from 
walking, cycling, and public transport to private vehicles by 
improving the quality of public transport. Creating a transport 
44 Vehicle-kilometres is a measure of traffic flow. It is a unit of measurement 
representing the movement of a road motor vehicle over one kilometre 
(http://glossary.eea.europa.eu/terminology/concept_html?term=vehicle-km)
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environment that facilitates “shift” requires development 
of a system of alternatives that has higher utility to users 
than private vehicles, which among other factors, implies 
that services must be high-quality and reliable as well as 
accessible to a large proportion of the population. The system 
should also allow easy transitions between the different 
transportation modes through physical, operational and 
fare integration. Examples include Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) 
(e.g., Ahmedabad, Bogota, Guangzhou, Johannesburg, Los 
Angeles, Mexico City and Rio de Janeiro), Bike Share Systems 
(e.g., Copenhagen, Hangzhou, London, Mexico City and 
Paris), Rail-based mass transit (e.g., Berlin, Hong Kong and 
New York), Pedestrian and Cycling network development 
(e.g., Copenhagen and Guangzhou), Parking Management 
(e.g., Budapest, San Francisco and Zurich), and Intermodal 
freight System Management (e.g., Germany). Bus Rapid 
Transit systems are discussed later in this section.
Similar to “avoid” policies, a number of instruments are 
available to support “shift” policies and often a combination 
of such instruments will be appropriate. In addition to the 
planning, economic, regulatory and information instruments 
already mentioned above, technology-focused instruments 
are also available to support “shift” policies (Sakamoto et al., 
2010). For example, instruments aimed at increasing vehicle 
efficiency, through technologies for engine transmission 
and driveline improvements, hybrid systems, lightweight 
materials or further development of low carbon and 
alternative fuels, can be part of “shift” policies (Dalkmann 
and Brannigan, 2007).
“Improve” policies – aim and examples
These are policies aimed at improving the energy efficiency 
of vehicles and fuels through the introduction of new vehicle 
technologies and policies, including vehicle performance 
standards, voluntary programmes, fiscal mechanisms, low 
carbon and alternative fuels, financial subsidies for advanced 
vehicle technologies, fleet scrappage programmes, amongst 
others. The aim is to ensure that future vehicles and fuels 
are cleaner, and to encourage efficient vehicles (Dalkmann 
and Sakamoto, 2012). Best practices for vehicle performance 
are discussed later in this section. 
The Avoid-Shift-Improve framework has been devised 
to support governments and institutions at all levels to 
develop better and more comprehensive approaches to 
transport planning, urban mobility, and commodity flows. 
The following examples describe best practices, barriers, and 
opportunities within the Avoid-Shift-Improve framework.
“Avoid” policies that work: transit-oriented development
Transit-oriented development is the practice of mixing 
residential, commercial and recreational land uses to 
promote high-density neighbourhoods around public transit 
stations.  One of the earliest and most successful examples of 
transit oriented development comes from Curitiba in Brazil. 
In the 1970’s the city government actively promoted the 
organization of the city along high-density transit corridors. 
It integrated zoning laws and transportation planning into 
the city’s master plan. It also created pedestrian malls, 
instituted parking policies and developed cost-effective Bus 
Rapid Transit corridors.  
The availability of comprehensive studies of the emission 
reduction potential of transit-oriented development is 
limited. However, a study for the USA estimates that 
applying transit-oriented development best practices could 
both reduce vehicle-kilometres by 10% from 2005 levels and 
cut annual greenhouse gas emissions by 145 million tonnes 
of CO2e in 2030, the equivalent of some 30 million cars in 
the USA or 35 large coal power plants (Winkelman et al., 
2009). Importantly, the study finds that these reductions 
Bus and bicycles, Malmo, Sweden. Credit: Tupungato/Shutterstock.com 
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are associated with significant economic benefits, yielding 
net cost savings per tonne of CO2, when avoided costs for 
infrastructure, fuel, insurance and projected tax revenues 
from economic development, are taken into account.
“Shift” policies that work: Bus Rapid Transit
Bus Rapid Transit systems can provide the high-quality 
service needed to maintain a strong public transport system. 
In addition to the construction and operational features that 
can make BRT run smoothly, some of the key elements are 
frequent, high capacity service, higher operating speeds than 
conventional buses, separated lanes, distinct stations with 
level boarding, and fare prepayment and unique branding 
(Owen et al., 2012).
Since the 1970s, BRT has expanded to more than 100 cities 
around the world, with the largest increase taking place 
during the last 10 years. BRT or similar systems are now in 
place in many cities in Latin America, Asia, North America, 
and Europe and represent approximately one percent of 
the global modal split. Despite many institutional and policy 
challenges, these systems have been adapted to a range of 
different physical and regulatory environments. 
The number of BRT systems has increased because they 
can reliably move large numbers of people and reduce travel 
times. Their expansion is also explained by the fact that the 
capital costs of BRT systems are between one-third and one-
tenth of that of rail system costs. 
Although BRT systems lead to lower emissions than many 
other transit options, they are usually constructed for other 
reasons, for example, to reduce local air pollution, traffic 
fatality rates, and road congestion (Transmilenio, 2011). 
There is a lack of studies assessing the emission reductions 
achieved through BRT, although project level estimates exist. 
For instance, in Bogota, Colombia, BRT is estimated to have 
resulted in emission reductions of 1.7 million metric tons 
CO2e over seven years45 (see also Box 4.2).
Barriers to more rapid expansion of BRT include inadequate 
fare levels and the fact that there is sometimes a preference 
for rail systems without adequate analysis of alternatives. 
Furthermore, overcrowding and deterioration of roadways 
in some places make BRT less attractive to potential users. 
45 http://cdm.unfccc.int/Projects/DB/DNV-CUK1159192623.07/view
Transit agencies can play an important role in maintaining 
the attractiveness of BRT through service and operation 
improvements and through communication with the public 
(Weber et al., 2011).  To illustrate, Jaipur City Transportation 
Service increased their ridership over 100% in one year by 
improving the fare structure, colour-coding bus routes, and 
improving operation by conducting adequate analysis of 
operations and cost data (Jain, 2011). The example of Jaipur 
city shows that large investments in infrastructure and 
technology are not always needed to create a “shift”.
Lessons and scope for scaling up transit oriented 
development and bus rapid transit
In light of the attractiveness of combined sound land use 
policies such as transit oriented development and bus rapid 
transit, many cities are looking at replicating these “avoid” 
and “shift” policy practices. They provide significant benefits 
from a social and private perspective in addition to curbing 
growth in emissions from transportation. Some of the key 
principles that could facilitate the scaling up of transit-
oriented development and BRT programmes are: 
(i) Identifying and assessing the co-benefits, such as road 
safety, improved air quality, job creation, social equity 
and health benefits, among others, in order to leverage 
political support.
(ii) Implementing the highest standard from the onset in 
order to minimise public discontent and makes future 
expansion and further investment easier.  
(iii) Improving accessibility through the integration of 
transit with active modes and surrounding land uses in 
order to attract citizens out of their private vehicles. 
(iv) Developing strong institutional support at the national, 
regional and local level to facilitate and ensure: 
• the efficiency of passing legislation and regulations, 
• the creation of comprehensive land use develop-
ment policies, and 
• the improvement of infrastructure finance mecha-
nisms.
(v) Engaging industry early-on to identify appropriate 
technologies, lower costs, streamline procurement 
procedures, and create a proper finance structure. 
Metrobus in Mexico City is a successful example of “shift”, where 10% of BRT riders have shifted from private cars 
(Investigaciones Sociales Aplicadas, 2007).  From its inception in 2005, it has grown to a system with four lines, covering 
95 km, and serving 687,000 passengers per day (City of Mexico, 2012). The location of the routes and stations along 
popular corridors makes the service attractive and easy to access for pedestrians. In addition, formalizing service and 
reducing mixing in traffic has reduced the number of road fatalities along the corridor.
Annually:
• 169 million passengers are served
• 36.7 million travel hours are saved
• 143,000 tons CO2 emissions are avoided
• and approximately 23 lives are saved
Note: EMBARQ calculations compared to a baseline without the BRT. Total time saved is based on average time 
savings per passenger trip. CO2 emissions avoided are based on the difference between modal split in the two scenarios, 
distance travelled by buses, and IPCC emission factors.
Box 4.2 Mexico City Metrobus system
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“Improve” policies that work: Vehicle Performance 
Standards for New Light-duty Vehicles
This section provides an overview of vehicle performance 
standards for new light-duty vehicles, which establish 
minimum requirements based on fuel consumption or 
greenhouse gas emissions per unit of distance travelled. 
A number of regulatory approaches to reducing light-duty 
vehicle fuel consumption and greenhouse gas emissions 
have evolved through the last several decades, relying on 
different test procedures, formulas, performance-based 
attributes and baselines. Seven countries including Australia, 
Canada, China, the European Union, Japan, South Korea, and 
USA, have established or are in the process of revising light-
duty vehicle fuel consumption or greenhouse gas emission 
standards. 
These standards have a proven track record for achieving 
vehicle efficiency improvements.  Approved and proposed 
vehicle performance standards are expected to reduce fuel 
consumption and greenhouse gas emissions of the new light-
duty fleet in these countries by over 50%  by 2025 from 2000 
levels (see Figure 4.2) (ClimateWorks Foundation and ICCT, 
2012). Because these standards have been implemented at the 
national level, their effects on total greenhouse gas emission 
reductions are substantial.  Adopted vehicle performance 
standards for the light-duty fleet are estimated to result in 
emission reductions of 0.8 GtCO2e globally in 2020 (ICCT, in 
press). In the case of the USA, the standards targeting model 
years 2012–16 are expected to save each car owner about 
US$3,000 over the life of the vehicle (USA. Environmental 
Protection Agency and National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration, 2010). Vehicle performance standards also 
stimulate technology innovation by requiring automakers to 
build more efficient vehicles. Substantial improvements in 
vehicle efficiency can be realized through engine transmission 
and driveline improvements, hybrid systems, lightweight 
materials and better aerodynamics and rolling resistance.
Lessons and scope for scaling up
There are several key principles for successful introduction 
of vehicle performance standards including: 
(i) standards should be technology-neutral46 so that 
markets find the most cost-effective solution; 
(ii) standards should be made continuously more strin-
gent – by 3 to 6% annually – to encourage on-going 
innovation and send long-term signals to automakers  
(ClimateWorks Foundation and ICCT, 2012); 
(iii) standards should include all vehicle classes to prevent 
loopholes; 
(iv) standards should not be weight-based, but footprint-
based so they no longer discourage the use of light-
weight materials; 
(v) countries should improve testing procedures and rules 
so that test vehicle efficiency closely reflects real-world 
performance; and, 
(vi) countries should combine vehicle performance 
standards with fiscal mechanisms and vehicle scrappage 
programmes that can help incentivize purchase of the 
most efficient vehicles and speed up the turnover of 
the existing fleet.
These international best practices for successful policy 
design can also be used to strengthen standards in places 
where they already exist. Designing effective standards 
requires strong institutional support from the governmental 
agencies that hold the regulatory authority to approve 
the standards, as well as extensive technical expertise and 
knowledge of international results to apply lessons learned 
from other countries.
46 That is, standards should not advocate a specific technology
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4.3.4 Best practice policies to curb deforestation 
Introduction
Forests provide major ecosystem services such as 
watershed protection and biodiversity conservation, as well as 
livelihoods for around 1.6 billion, mostly poor, people (Chao, 
2012). Greenhouse gas emissions from the forestry sector 
are caused by deforestation and forest degradation. These 
emissions, which constitute the largest non-energy source of 
greenhouse gas emissions, are estimated to be 4.4 GtCO2e/
yr in 2008, and represent about 11% of global anthropogenic 
CO2 emissions (see Chapter 2). 
Deforestation is mainly caused by expansion of agricultural 
frontiers (Angelsen, 2010; Pfaff et al., 2010), while forest 
degradation can be caused by natural phenomena (e.g., 
diseases and pests, storms, fire, drought and other climatic 
stresses) or by anthropogenic factors (e.g., air pollution, 
fire, economic overexploitation and overgrazing) or by a 
combination of  both natural and anthropogenic factors 
(EEA, 2011). 
Although it has remained under-utilized, “avoided 
deforestation47” is considered a low-cost greenhouse gas 
emissions reduction option (IPCC, 2007). While the annual 
rate of tropical deforestation decreased from 160,000 km2 
in the 1990s to 130,000 km2 in the 2000s (FAO, 2010), it is 
believed that significantly greater reduction in deforestation 
is achievable. 
The following sections describe policies that are effective 
at curbing deforestation. Four distinct policy categories are 
presented:
Establishing protected areas: This involves designating 
some forest areas as protected areas48. This is arguably the 
most common policy instrument for preserving tropical 
forests. It is generally effective in preventing deforestation, 
but is even more effective when the protected areas are 
close to expanding frontiers (e.g., expanding agricultural 
frontiers) rather than in remote low-threat areas (Joppa and 
Pfaff, 2010; Pfaff et al., 2010; Nelson and Chomitz, 2011).
Using command-and-control measures: This involves the 
enactment and enforcement of environmental regulations 
and putting in place adequate monitoring structures to 
ensure compliance (Hargrave and Kis-Katos, in press).
Using economic instruments: This involves the use of 
economic tools such as taxes, subsidies and payments for 
ecosystem services for encouraging forest conservation 
(Angelsen, 2010; Pfaff et al., 2010). 
Creating policies affecting drivers and contexts: This 
involves creating or changing sectoral policies, institutional 
frameworks and governance structures so as to influence 
the dynamics of deforestation (Angelsen, 2010; Pfaff et al., 
2010).
Successful national strategies for curbing deforestation 
have typically included a combination of these categories 
(Chomitz et al., 2007). Brazil and Costa Rica stand out as 
examples of countries that have successfully sustained anti-
47 Avoided deforestation is the prevention or reduction of deforestation in 
order to decrease greenhouse gas emissions. 
48 A protected area, according to IUCN, is “a clearly defined geographical space, 
recognized, dedicated and managed, through legal or other effective means, 
to achieve the long term conservation of nature with associated ecosystem 
services and cultural values” (Dudley, 2008).
deforestation policies with large-scale results. The section 
below takes a closer look at policies in these countries 
and how their successful experience may be reproduced 
elsewhere. 
Policies that work
In Brazil, recent deforestation has occurred mostly in 
the Amazon, so we focus on policies applied there. The 
Amazon forest is the largest tropical forest on earth, holding 
a significant share of the world’s biodiversity and 66±7 GtC, 
or 23% of the world’s forest carbon49 (Saatchi et al. 2007; 
FAO, 2010). Deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon reached 
its second highest historical level in 2004 (27,772 km2), and 
was responsible for the emission of around 1.1 GtCO2e. Since 
then, deforestation has decreased by three-quarters (6,418 
km2 in 2011) (INPE-EM, 2012). Public policies contributed 
substantially to this reduction (CEPAL/IPEA/GIZ 2011). One 
estimate suggests that they were responsible for about one-
half of the reduction between 2005 and 2009, or 0.6 GtCO2e. 
The remainder has been attributed to lower agricultural 
commodity prices (Assuncao et al., 2012). Compared to the 
country’s official BaU scenario50, Brazil avoided 2.8 GtCO2e in 
emissions from 2006 to 2011 (Brazil. Ministry of Environment 
of Brazil, 2012).
Costa Rica has gone from very high annual deforestation 
rates  (around 3 to 4% of its forest area/year) during the 
1960s and 1970s to close to zero forest loss today (Camino 
et al., 2000; Sánchez-Azofeifa et al., 2007).51 Public policies 
were also important drivers of this change, together with 
structural economic changes (Camino et al., 2000; Sánchez-
Azofeifa et al., 2007; Robalino et al., 2008; Brown and Bird, 
2011). 
Protected areas: In the last decade, Brazil has increased its 
Amazon protected areas, indigenous lands and sustainable-
use areas by a significant 709,000 km2 representing 45.6% 
of the Amazon biome in 2009 (Soares-Filho et al., 2010). 
Much of the recent expansion of protected areas occurred 
near especially threatened areas (CEPAL/IPEA/GIZ, 2011). 
The expansion of protected areas has significantly decreased 
both Amazon fire incidence and deforestation (Chomitz and 
Thomas, 2003; Nepstad et al., 2006; Arima et al., 2007; 
Soares-Filho et al., 2010). 
Protected areas in Costa Rica represent 24% of its territory 
(1.2 million ha) and are used more intensively than in 
Brazil, especially for ecotourism (Hoffman, 2011)52. Tourist 
numbers increased from 387,000 in 1988 to 2.5 million in 
2008, when tourism reached 15% of GDP. Ecotourism alone 
now brings in more foreign currency than livestock exports 
did previously (Camino et al. 2000; Brown and Bird, 2011; 
Christian et al., 2011).
Command-and-control measures: During the 2000s, 
Brazil invested heavily in modernizing its satellite-based 
monitoring strategy. Detailed deforestation data has directly 
supported field-based law enforcement in real time, and 
49 Considering only carbon stored on above ground live biomass.
50 The official BaU scenario assumes 19,535 km2 of annual deforestation, which 
equals the 1995-2006 average.
51 Some disagreement about forest cover changes in Costa Rica remains 
(Sánchez-Azofeifa et al. 2007)
52 One specific marketing advantage for Costa Rica is its closeness to the 
American market.
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enforcement teams can now reach new deforestation spots 
a few days after its detection (INPE, 2008). Furthermore, the 
federal environment police (IBAMA) was modernized and 
innovative enforcement measures to combat deforestation, 
such as confiscation of illegally used assets (e.g., cattle, 
timber and machinery) and area-based trade embargos were 
adopted. Federal prosecutors also made slaughterhouses 
and supermarkets liable for offences by suppliers involved in 
illegal deforestation. Several studies indicate improved law 
enforcement as a key to reduced deforestation (Barreto and 
Silva 2010; CEPAL/IPEA/GIZ, 2011; Hargrave and Kis-Katos, 
in press). After 2007, Brazil’s federal government blacklisted 
high-deforesting municipalities (up to 42 out of 756) and 
carried out law enforcement raids, embargoes, and other 
actions. Concentrating on selected targets was not only cost-
efficient, but also made local mayors share responsibility for 
deforestation (CEPAL/IPEA/GIZ, 2011). 
In Costa Rica, command-and-control measures were also 
part of the policy mix, though somewhat less prominently 
compared to Brazil. A complete ban on forest conversion 
was adopted already in 1997. Although, enforcement was 
not always 100% effective, the task was generally easier than 
in the Amazon, due to smaller forest size, lower agricultural 
land pressures, and clearer land-tenure arrangements 
(Camino et al., 2000; Sánchez-Azofeifa et al., 2007). 
Economic instruments: In Brazil, economic instruments 
have so far played a relatively small role. By contrast, Costa 
Rica is a model for using forest-based economic instruments 
in the developing world. This has included applying forest 
conservation and reforestation incentives on private farms 
(Brown and Bird, 2011). From 1979 to 1990, policies focused 
on tax breaks for plantations and natural forest conservation 
(Camino et al., 2000; Brown and Bird, 2011). After 1991, 
direct subsidies for farm-level forest conservation were 
introduced, culminating from 1997 onwards in the 
programme of payments for ecosystem services (PES) 
(protection of watersheds, carbon stocks, biodiversity, and 
natural beauty). PES was predominantly financed by a new 
tax on fossil fuels and by international financing (Camino et 
al., 2000; Brown and Bird, 2011).
Many argue that economic incentives were central to 
Costa Rica’s conservation success (Sánchez-Azofeifa et al., 
2007; Robalino et al., 2008). The effectiveness of PES remains 
uncertain though, because deforestation was already small 
when PES policies were introduced (Pagiola, 2008). 
Policies targeted at drivers and contexts
Traditionally, Costa Rica subsidized forest conversion for 
crops and pastures. Falling commodity prices, economic 
crisis and structural adjustment programmes in the 1980s 
were key factors for phasing out these incentives and curbing 
land clearing (Camino et al., 2000; Kleinn et al., 2002; Brown 
and Bird, 2011). Well-defined land tenure (Brown and Bird, 
2011) also lowered pressure for forest conversion. This 
contrasts with the Amazon, where land appropriation by 
homesteaders (clearing land to establish or consolidate 
property rights) was an important driver of deforestation.  
Compared to the Amazon’s abundant forest, Costa Rica’s 
forests became scarcer earlier, which gradually led to a 
political commitment to address deforestation and promote 
sustainable forest management. Costa Rica experienced 
a typical turning point in its ‘forest transition’, with rising 
wages and urban employment pulling workers from farms 
into cities (see Rudel et al., 2010). Costa Rica’s high level of 
commitment to economic and human development, and 
sustainable development, were also instrumental. 
In Brazil, stagnating commodity prices (soy, beef) from 
the mid-2000s explain part of the decrease in deforestation 
(Barreto and Silva, 2010; Soares-Filho et al., 2010; Assuncao 
et al., 2012). But Brazil also managed to mobilize widespread 
internal political support for curbing deforestation. Bringing 
the deforestation agenda into the President’s Cabinet created 
unprecedented political will to coordinate anti-deforestation 
policies across ministries. Policies were bundled into a single 
strategy which covered 14 government ministries. This was 
a major factor in the success story of curbing deforestation 
(CEPAL/IPEA/GIZ, 2011). 
Scope for scaling-up
The previous sections illustrate that policies to curb 
deforestation typically require cross-sector policy 
coordination involving multiple stakeholders. Similarly, a 
policy mix of incentives, disincentives, and appropriate 
enabling policies may be most appropriate. But which 
enabling factors are key to replicating and scaling-up 
successful policies?
First, countries may learn from the Brazilian experience, 
where the capacity to properly monitor deforestation was 
a key factor in reducing deforestation. Monitoring can 
be strengthened without major changes in regulation or 
political support, and requires mainly financial resources 
and technology transfer. 
Second, to achieve large-scale results, countries need 
strong political commitment from the core of government. 
In both Costa Rica and Brazil, this provided the basis for 
developing and implementing comprehensive strategies 
across sectors and levels of government.
Third, as stated earlier, protected areas generally have 
an important impact on conserving forests, but they can be 
even more effective if they are positioned near deforestation 
frontiers or areas liable to future threats. Protected areas 
with sustainable use of natural resources53 provide an 
interesting compromise between local livelihoods and 
environmental interests, and could therefore serve as an 
option in areas where there is conflicting interest between 
forest conservation and local livelihoods.
Fourth, in Brazil, a sudden increase in enforcement of existing 
forestry laws triggered strong reactions from agricultural 
interests against the laws (Barreto and Araujo, 2012). To avoid a 
similar situation, countries may have to combine enforcement 
with new legislation and institutions. Costa Rica’s combination 
of incentives, disincentives and enabling measures is a 
noteworthy example of an easy-to-accept policy mix. 
53 According to IUCN, a “protected area with sustainable use of natural 
resources” refers to an area designated for the purpose of “conserving 
ecosystems and habitats together with associated cultural values and 
traditional natural resource management systems. They are generally 
large, with most of the area in a natural condition, where a proportion is 
under sustainable natural resource management and where low-level non-
industrial use of natural resources compatible with nature conservation is 
seen as one of the main aims of the area” http://www.iucn.org/about/work/
programmes/gpap_home/gpap_quality/gpap_pacategories/.
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Fifth, well-defined land tenure can provide an incentive 
for conserving forests. Once stronger institutions and secure 
property rights to forest lands have been established, economic 
incentives for conservation in private properties may become 
nationally applicable, rather than restricted to pilot projects. To 
maximize effectiveness, PES schemes may target areas where 
deforestation risks and forest services such as medicinal plants, 
watershed protection, and lumber are most abundant. 
Finally, economy-wide policies can in some cases be one 
of the underlying causes of deforestation. While some land-
clearing incentives, such as global commodity prices, are 
usually outside a particular government’s control, others 
including taxes, subsidies, credit provision, and regulations, 
are not. Removing perverse national policy incentives may 
reduce both government budgets and forest pressures, 
resulting in a win-win situation.
It is noteworthy that changes in Brazilian and Costa Rican 
policies pre-dated the adoption of the Reduced Emissions 
from Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD+) policies 
under the UNFCCC. In Costa Rica, the main motivation was 
to support forest owners producing domestic environmental 
services (watershed protection and touristic landscape 
beauty). In Brazil, national and international public opinion 
exerted political pressure favouring protection of the 
Amazon, due to co-benefits linked to conservation. A focus 
on such benefits may thus also render climate change 
mitigation strategies more politically viable.
Currently, REDD+ seems to provide low-cost opportunities 
for mitigating emissions (Streck and Parker, 2012) while 
producing important co-benefits (Strassburg et al., 2012). 
National anti-deforestation policies and on-the-ground pilot 
projects are both considered core to REDD+. Most tropical 
forest-rich countries are already designing their REDD+ 
strategies, and developed countries have been, in turn, 
requested to scale up short- and long-term financing. In 
most cases, REDD+ strategies will need to adopt customized 
policy mixes to become effective. The cases of Costa Rica and 
Brazil can help provide some of the ingredients. 
4.4 Conclusions
The analysis of studies published in the past year do not 
change estimates of the total mitigation potential in 2020 of 
17 ± 3 GtCO2e identified in the Bridging the Emissions Gap 
Report (UNEP, 2011).  However, while the emission reduction 
potential remains significant, time is running out. Delays in 
action will gradually reduce the 2020 mitigation potential 
because of emissions “lock-in”. 
It is also known that emission reduction potential can only 
be realized if strong, long-term and sector-specific policies 
are in place at the global and national levels. The good 
news is that a wide range of policies, successful in cutting 
greenhouse gas emissions, have already been adopted in 
various sectors and countries. The second part of this chapter 
analysed how such ambitious, sector-specific policies can be 
instrumental in achieving the emission reduction potential. 
Although market-based instruments play a crucial 
role for emission reductions, experience has shown that 
market imperfections, including information asymmetries 
and undefined property rights, limit the application of 
such instruments. Additionally, some of the key decisions 
that affect emission trajectories for decades and, in some 
cases, centuries, are not market-based. For this and other 
reasons, command-and-control instruments such as 
codes, standards, labels and zoning, together with price-
based policy instruments such as taxes or payments for 
environmental services, should all be part of the considered 
options, depending on national and local circumstances. 
The political feasibility of introducing ambitious regulatory 
measures such as standards and regulations is higher in 
some sectors, such as buildings and transportation, which 
are intrinsically local. The same is true for most of the timber 
extraction in tropical forests when it is directed to domestic 
markets. However, the range of benefits associated with 
the implementation of the policies described in this chapter 
is so wide (reduction in energy consumption and prices, 
improved air quality, increased environmental services 
from forest protection, etc.) that these examples should 
motivate national and local governments around the world 
to replicate or expand similar policies. 
Rio Negro in the Amazon River basin, Brazil. Credit: AND Inc/Shutterstock.com 
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Clearly, successful scale-up of the policies described in 
the chapter requires that the instruments be tailored to 
local economic, financial and social conditions, such as the 
existing capital stock, weather and urbanization patterns, 
technical capacity, and economic and demographic trends. 
Forest policies, for example, must account for the existing 
variety of ecological and economic aspects of land use. 
The presence of effective institutions is also crucial to the 
successful implementation of policies. The availability of 
appropriate monitoring and enforcement mechanisms are 
also a  key to success.  
Creating the right conditions for effective policies can take 
time even  when there is strong political will. Ideally, policy 
design needs to be strong enough to resist the volatility of 
electoral cycles. 
This chapter can be viewed as an attempt to provide 
policymakers with an understanding of how certain policies 
can also be significantly leveraged to help bridge the 
emissions gap.
Among the key findings of this chapter, three stand out. 
Firstly, many developed and developing countries have 
already taken action to implement sector-specific policies 
that, in addition to reducing carbon emissions, have also 
proven effective at delivering a wide range of other benefits. 
These have included, saving money, reducing air pollution, 
improving public health, strengthening energy security and 
creating jobs. In fact, in most of the examples presented in 
this chapter, the case for policy implementation was triggered 
by national and local interests, rather than climate concerns.
Secondly, while it is encouraging that so many countries 
are actively pursuing targeted, sector-specific policies 
with the potential to significantly reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions, the window for closing the emissions gap is 
getting narrower as we get closer to 2020. Since today’s 
investments in buildings, transportation systems, factories, 
and cities will set future energy use patterns for decades, 
early policy action at the national and local level is essential 
to avoid emissions “lock in”, and prevent energy waste and 
excessive pollution. Losses, often permanent ones in carbon 
storage and in biodiversity, can be avoided with effective 
deforestation policies that create norms and incentives for 
good land use. 
Thirdly, the considerable progress in sector-specific policy 
implementation has the potential to make the adoption of 
a coherent climate policy more likely, both at the national 
and international level. The scaling up of effective policies 
both in terms of ambition and geographical reach is certainly 
challenging, but it is also feasible, as the cases analyzed here 
suggest. If pursued broadly, these successful policies would 
set the world on a more sustainable climate trajectory.
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